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ABSTRACT 
 
 
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF CHANNEL PROGRAM SELECTIONS: 
RETAILER’S CHOICE AMONG PARITY TRADE PROMOTIONS 
By 
 
AMIT PODDAR 
 
13th June 2007 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Naveen Donthu 
 
Major Department: Marketing 
 
 
This research tried to explain the role of calculative commitment, loyalty commitment 
and power asymmetry on behavioral commitment in a business to business scenario. We 
specifically looked at the trade promotion scenario since retailers face more trade 
promotions than they can accept and extant research suggests that retailers always choose 
trade promotions that offer the greatest immediate benefit. This dissertation addressed the 
following managerial question, “How does a firm select a program (trade deal) when all 
its vendors offer the same short term economic incentives”.  We proposed that other 
aspects of retailer’s relationship with its vendors determine / influence the program 
selection decision.  First, incentives imbedded in channel relationships namely economic 
incentives (e.g., access to new products) and social incentives (e.g., affect toward vendor 
/ salesperson) lead to a selection decision.  Second, the power asymmetry the retailer has 
with the various vendors directly impacts decision making and also moderates the impact 
of the embedded economic / social incentives. We used commitment theory and an 
experimental design to test our model. We find that calculative commitment has the 
greatest impact on decision making followed by power asymmetry. We also find that 
loyalty commitment has the least impact. We also found that under high power 
asymmetry, calculative commitment has a bigger impact than loyalty commitment on 
behavioral commitment than under low power asymmetry when loyalty commitment has 
a bigger impact. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists have long tried to understand choice behavior of decision makers. Classical 
economists and decision theorists have used utility theory to explain the choice behavior 
of the rational decision maker (Stigler 1966). Classical utility theory has now been 
extended into expected utility theory where decision makers are thought to compute the 
expected utility of outcomes associated with each decision alternative and choose the 
decision alternative with the maximum expected utility (Puto 1987). However the main 
problem with expected utility theory has been its inability to account for context effects 
(Puto 1987).  
 
This dissertation is an attempt to understand decision choice in a business to business 
purchase situation. Our specific goal is to understand how choices are made especially 
when short term utilities offered by the different choices are the same. Classical 
economic theory which is based on the rational man hypothesis has always held that if a 
person is rational, he will always prefer an option that offers better economic benefits. 
This view is especially true in a business to business purchase situation where purchase 
managers are supposed to make their decisions in a rational manner due to the principle 
of “justifiability”(Vyas and Woodside 1984) that exists in business settings. Justifiability 
means that all decisions that are made in a business setting have to be justifiable to 
outside third parties.  
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While the idea of rationality is quite accepted in the marketing and economic literature it 
has also faced strong challenges. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in their work on 
prospect theory proved that perfectly rational people make seemingly irrational decisions 
depending on how a problem is framed. According to prospect theory people become risk 
averse in gains and risk seeking in losses. Therefore, even if the utility offered by two 
options is same, depending on how the utility is presented different decision outcomes 
can result.  
 
Our focus in this dissertation is to understand the structure and process of this kind of 
decision making in a channel situation. In channel situations decision makers have to 
make a lot of difficult decisions involving considerable risk. Since our focus is not on 
decision framing, we make the assumption that decision makers do make rational choices 
when faced with differing options and they always choose options that offer better 
economic benefits than those that do not.  
 
However channel members face lots of situations where the decision making is not so 
clear cut. Decision makers often have to choose between options that offer same 
economic benefits. For example in a retail scenario, there are many new products that vie 
for the same shelf space and offer the same margin and short term gain to the retailer. 
Similarly, when channel members seek new partners, prospective partners could offer the 
same benefits. When we look at trade promotions, it is possible that two vendors offer the 
same trade promotion but the retailer is forced to make a choice. 
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We try to understand what factors make buyers make a behavioral commitment to one 
party versus other especially when both options offer equal short term utilities. What is 
the structure of the decision calculus and what processes guides the decision making. We 
believe that commitment theory allows us to understand the structure of the decision 
process and the heuristic systematic model (HSM) allows us to explain the processes of 
decision process. According to commitment theory the behavioral commitment (or the 
choice) that is made by one channel member to another member can be predicted using 
an economic, psychological and sociological perspective (Iverson and Roy 1994). HSM 
theory (Eagly and Chaiken 1993) on the other hand predicts that the importance of these 
antecedents would vary depending on the structural relationships between the parties in 
the channel. Structural relationships are defined as the power asymmetries that may exist 
between the two parties in any channel relationship. 
 
While this structure and process of the decision calculus can work in all kinds of channel 
situations, we specifically test it in the trade promotion context. We choose the trade 
promotion context because the likelihood of a retailer facing parity situations is much 
larger when dealing with trade promotions than in other channel contexts. For example, 
while it is true that sometimes channel members can be faced with the prospect of 
selecting a channel partner when most of them offer the same short term economic 
benefit, the likelihood of such an event occurring is quite small since the number of times 
new partners are selected in the lifetime of a firm is also quite small. On the other hand 
trade promotions decisions are made on a much more regular basis and thus the 
probability increases that managers would be faced with a parity situation very often. 
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Moreover, manufacturers can easily learn about and match the trade offers made by 
competitors. 
 
From the industry’s point of view understanding of trade promotion choice is a very 
important and relevant problem. The consumer packaged goods sector spends around $75 
billion on trade promotion (Dreze and Bell 2003) annually. According to latest figures 
consumer packaged goods companies spend as much as 16% of overall gross sales on 
trade promotions (Wellman 2005). The magnitude of this number becomes apparent 
when we compare it with the total money spent on advertising, which is only around $37 
billion. Trade promotion overall commands 55% of the total money spent on  promotion 
(Wellman 2005). The rest of the money is spent on advertising (20%), traditional 
consumer promotions (15%) and 10% for account specific consumer promotions 
(Wellman 2005). The sheer amount of money spent demands that researchers spend an 
adequate amount of time in understanding trade promotions. However literature review 
suggests that the trade promotion area is seriously under researched compared to its share 
in the overall research on marketing mix budget.  
 
The reasons for this apathy are many. First, trade promotions are considered by managers 
and some academics as a “cost of doing business” which leads them to not consider it as 
worthy of investigation. Second, and more importantly, trade promotion data is 
notoriously hard to collect, as companies consider trade promotion strategies as trade 
secrets and therefore loathe sharing them with researchers. These two factors have 
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ensured that most literature in trade promotions have used analytical modeling and 
simulation as the means of studying the trade promotion phenomenon.  
 
Extant research has tried to answer questions like: why firms promote (Blattberg, Eppen, 
and Lieberman 1981; Lal 1990; Raju 1995; Varian 1980), tried to measure the value of 
trade promotions (Abraham and Lodish 1990; Blattberg and Levin 1987; Brown 1974; 
Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Goodman and Moody 1970; Kopp and Greyser 1987; 
Kruger 1987; Quelch 1983; Zerillo and Iacobucci 1995), tried to identify the factors that 
lead to successful trade promotions(Mitchel 1985; Quelch 1983) and explain how trade 
promotion success is defined (Hardy 1986). Researchers have also tried to understand the 
phenomenon of trade promotion by using game theoretic approaches (Kasulis et al. 1999; 
Rao, Arjunji, and Murthi 1995) and explained how trade promotion leads to inefficiencies 
due to the phenomenon of forward buying (Blattberg and Levin 1987; Buzzell, Quelch, 
and Salmon 1990; Lal, Little, and Villas-Boas 1996). In addition research has also 
offered suggestions about improving trade promotions using different kinds of 
promotions like EDLP (every day low pricing), scan backs, electronic forward buys, etc. 
(Ailawadi, Farris, and Shames 1999; Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon 1990; Dreze and Bell 
2003; Zerillo and Iacobucci 1995). Finally research has looked at the ill effects of trade 
promotions on long term franchise building (Mohr and Low 1993; Zerillo and Iacobucci 
1995).  
 
While a lot of ground has been covered in understanding trade promotions, it is miniscule 
when compared to research on consumer promotions and advertising. Moreover, as 
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indicated before, most of this research is analytical or simulations-based. Therefore there 
exists tremendous scope for adding to our knowledge of trade promotions, especially 
using empirical or experimental data. One particular area that is virtually untouched is 
choice behavior of retailers in choosing trade promotions. Several recent trends make this 
problem worth studying. 
 
First, supermarkets in recent years have shown a tendency to get bigger with each passing 
year. Recent studies show that an average supermarket stores carry 30,000 SKU’s 
(Boatwright 2001; Morton 2005) and super centers carry anywhere from 70,000 to 
80,000 SKU’s (Tarnowski 2006). Second, consolidation in the retail sector has meant that 
all manufacturers have become increasingly dependent on a few key retailers to get their 
products to the consumer. Combined with these two trends is the increasing competition 
in any product category. The combined effect of all these factors has led to an explosion 
in trade promotion deals on offer. Consumer price sensitivity and the willingness of 
retailers to use their market power have ensured that manufacturers are forced to offer 
more trade promotions by forgoing other forms of promotions.  
 
However, this explosion in trade promotions has lead to another greater problem which 
can be aptly described as a crisis of plenty. A retailer at any point in time can only accept 
a limited number of trade promotions, much less than the overall number of promotions 
on offer (Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Murry and Heide 1998). This happens due to the 
following two reasons: First, most trade promotions come with a rider. The manufacturer 
expects the retailer to perform some tasks in order to avail of the trade promotion. 
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Promotions of this type include shelf displays, cooperative advertising etc. Retailers only 
have limited ability and display space (Murry and Heide 1998) to take on tasks that 
involve coordination with numerous vendors, all of whom want the best support for their 
product and want to run “pay for performance” trade promotions. 
 
 Second, trade promotions which don’t expect any effort on the part of the retailer (like 
off invoice, volume discounts etc) are based on the idea that the economic benefits induce 
the retailers to forward buy (Blattberg and Levin 1987). The retailer also understands the 
direct economic incentive and retail forward buying is a well documented phenomenon 
(Blattberg and Levin 1987; Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon 1990) . Because the retailer 
forward buys and therefore locks up his capital as stock, he can only participate in a 
limited number of trade promotions even though theoretically the retailer may want to 
avail of all the trade promotions on offer. 
 
Since the retailer can only accept a few trade promotions, he is forced to choose between 
the different offers that are available to him. Therefore understanding the choice 
mechanism of retailers becomes very important for the vendors as the increased 
consolidation of retail industry have meant that the vendors are increasingly dependent on 
the retailers agreeing to push their brands versus their competitors.  However, very few 
researchers have looked at this problem in any detail.  
 
The first research attempt in this direction was made by Heeler, Kearney, and Mehaffet 
(1973) who looked at the problem of new product selection by supermarkets. Their focus 
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was however on determining the decision process used by retailers (compensatory versus 
non-compensatory choice). The second attempt was made by Walters (1989) who 
conducted an empirical investigation to find out what determines the level of retailer 
trade support. He found empirical evidence to suggest that economic incentives contained 
in deals like advertising support, price reductions and product displays significantly affect 
retailer support of trade deals. The most recent attempt was made by Murry and Heide 
(1998) who studied the role of interpersonal relationships and economic incentives on 
retailer participation in trade promotions.  
 
One common thread in the findings of these researchers has been that retailers always 
support that vendor who provides superior economic incentives. The following quote 
from an executive of Safeway as reported in Murry and Heide (1998) pg 61 brings out 
this issue very clearly “Retailers don’t want more partners – we want more profits”. 
However the issue doesn’t get solved here. The finding that the retailer will always prefer 
a vendor who offers better short term economic incentives is not surprising and every 
vendor also knows that. We must also keep in mind that for the vendor the easiest 
variable to manipulate in its marketing mix is the incentive. Vendors usually know what 
their competitors are offering in terms of the incentives. Therefore if a vendor knows 
what the competitor’s incentive is, and also knows that retailers always choose 
promotions with the highest short term payoff, then the easiest strategy for the vendor is 
to match the economic payoff. 
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Therefore our specific research question becomes, “What is the structure and process of 
channel program selections, especially when retailers are faced with parity trade 
promotions?” When retailers have equal economic benefits flowing from two vendors, 
what makes them make a behavioral commitment to one vendor versus the other?  What 
factors lead to this kind of behavioral commitment?  
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter the same structure and process can also be 
applied to many other channel contexts. For example how does a manufacturer choose 
between two distributors when both offer same economic benefits, or how does a retailer 
choose a between two new products when both offer equal level of sales. In short, this 
research can be expanded to include all situations where there is parity in the options 
available and there is limitation in the ability to choose multiple options.  
 
In this research commitment theory (Allen and Meyer 1990; Meyer and Allen 1984; 
Meyer and Allen 1991) is used to understand and explain the structure of the decision 
calculus. We propose that the behavioral commitment of the retailer is a function of the 
retailer’s affective, calculative and normative commitment with the key vendor. To 
explain the process of the decision calculus we use the heuristic-systematic model (HSM)  
(Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Using HSM we posit that the effect of these three types of 
commitment is moderated by the power asymmetry that exists between the retailer and 
the vendor (Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson 1995). These two theories combined explain 
our model of trade promotion selection. 
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As mentioned previously, theoretical research has so far not looked at the issue of parity 
promotions. This research would attempt to fill this gap in literature. Furthermore, this 
research would attempt to examine the impact of the various types of commitment 
individually as well as jointly. It can be argued that in real life, mechanisms like affective, 
calculative and normative commitment manifest themselves in different combinations 
(Bradach and Eccles 1989; Murry and Heide 1998). Therefore “theory tests should 
examine the effects of any one of the relevant mechanisms by explicitly controlling for 
the others” (Murry and Heide 1998). Also by explicitly controlling and jointly testing the 
impact of the various mechanisms we will be able to test for their relative importance in 
different power asymmetry situations. This will also allow us to test for the interaction 
between the various variables and how they impact trade promotion choice behavior. 
 
This research will use experimental manipulation as a means of detecting the impact of 
the independent variables on behavioral commitment. The use of the experimental 
methodology in trade promotion research is rare because of the difficulty involved in 
manipulating the independent variables. Most of the research in channel choice has been 
conducted using the paramorphic (one describing the data rather than testing prior theory) 
(Heeler, Kearney, and Mehaffet 1973) approach. Even in channels research the use of 
experimental research has been rare (Gaski 1984).  
 
Data collected using a survey method and analyzed with regression, for example, cannot 
provide the insights because of three basic problems. First common method bias may 
influence the responses of the respondents. The relationship between the independent and 
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dependent variables could be an artifact of asking the same respondent questions about 
both the independent and dependent variables. Second, while survey research can give 
the strength of the relationships it cannot conclusively prove the causal linkages between 
two variables. Only experiments where the independent variables are consciously 
manipulated by the researcher can provide support for causal linkages. Third, the beta 
weights obtained in a regression cannot be compared for strength as the correlations 
between the independent variables prevent us from interpreting the beta weights. One 
way to compare beta weights without any bias is when the independent variables are 
orthogonal to each other. Experimental manipulation would allow us to maintain the 
orthogonality of the independent variables thus we will be able to obtain pure beta 
weights that can give us a sense of the importance of the independent variables. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following fashion: In the next chapter we provide 
a comprehensive review of the trade promotion literature. This will be followed by a 
chapter where we develop the conceptual model and present the research hypotheses. The 
next chapter would deal with the methodology and analysis, describing in detail how we 
develop the manipulations and collected the data and describing the results of the study. 
We will discuss analyze the findings and implications of the study in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There has not been too much work done in the trade promotion field in the last 30 years. 
Researchers have mainly focused their attention on consumer promotions which are deals 
that are offered by manufacturers directly to consumers or deals offered by retailers to 
consumers. In comparison trade promotions are deals that are offered to retailers by 
manufacturers. The reason for this lack of focus happens to be the general unavailability 
of data in the trade promotion field. In comparison the consumer promotion research has 
been greatly helped by the availability of scanner data.  
 
The lack of focus is severe enough that in the last 30 years no comprehensive meta-
analysis has been attempted on trade promotions research. Only two studies (Blattberg, 
Briesch, and Fox 1995; Raju 1995) have attempted to summarize promotions research. 
However, these studies looked at promotions as a whole, including both trade and 
consumer promotions. Moreover, both reviews were conducted over10 years ago and a 
lot of research in the last 10 years has expanded our understanding of trade promotions. 
This literature review attempts to provide an up to date account of what is known about 
trade promotions. 
 
The last 30 years have produced research on some very well defined lines. Our goal in 
the next few pages would be to enumerate these lines of thought, mention the major 
theoretical contributions and also present the empirical findings. For each major topic we 
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will elaborate on what the topic means in the context of trade promotions, why it has 
been deemed important and what empirical findings have emerged in that area. 
Why Firms Promote? 
 
The question that has most concerned researchers is why do firms offer trade promotions? 
After all trade promotions don’t build long term franchises. The logic that has been 
offered is that firms offer trade promotions in the hope that some of it gets passed by the 
retailers as consumer price promotions and these price promotions encourage trial. This 
explanation of encouraging trial seems reasonable; however, it doesn’t explain why firms 
who are in mature markets still have trade promotions (Raju 1995). The answer 
surprisingly has come mainly from the consumer promotions literature. Blattberg, Eppen, 
and Lieberman (1981) have argued that retailers use price promotion to shift inventory 
holding cost to the consumers, as consumers have lower holding costs.  
 
Others (Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990; Varian 1980) have argued that price discounts 
are a result of mixed strategy equilibriums where each firm chooses its prices from 
equilibrium probability distributions. Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal (1990) state that in a 
competitive market whenever one brand has lower brand equity than the rest, its 
competitors know that the weaker brand’s customers can be lured away by price 
discounts and tries to do just that. To defend its turf the weaker brand has to use 
promotions to keep its customers; the result is that all brands end up promoting. They 
also conclude from their theoretical model that weaker brands tend to gain more from 
temporary price discounts. On the other hand when all competing brands have a high 
brand loyalty, there is a pure equilibrium and no one promotes. 
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Another interesting explanation for discounts is provided by Lal (1990) who says that 
many brands promote as a form of implicit collusion to prevent the encroachment of 
private brands. They come to this conclusion by studying the beverages market and find 
that the national brands fight off competition from the local brands by reducing their 
prices in alternate periods in an infinite horizon game.  
Measuring Value of Trade Promotions 
It is now well accepted that trade promotions lead to increased sales in the short run 
(Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Hanssens, Parsons, and Schultz 2001; Srinivasan et al. 2004) 
if not in the long run. However researchers and practitioners have often wondered if the 
increased sales gets translated into increased value captured by the firm (Zerillo and 
Iacobucci 1995) in terms of incremental revenue minus the cost of the promotion. The 
first researcher to bring this problem out in the open was Brown (1974). He contended 
that manufacturers were not able to evaluate the value of trade promotions because they 
were not trying hard enough and because of a common perception in industry circles that 
trade deals were an uncontrollable cost of doing business (Kopp and Greyser 1987) 
therefore not worth investigating. 
 
However, researchers have also struggled to actually measure the profit impact of trade 
dollars (Mohr and Low 1993). Researchers and practitioners have long speculated that 
trade promotions may actually be value losers (Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Kruger 1987; 
Lucas 1996) and have wanted to know the long and short term impact of trade 
promotions (Kopp and Greyser 1987; Quelch 1983). It is believed that manufacturers 
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blame the retailers for taking advantage of trade promotions and not passing on benefits 
to the ultimate consumers (Chevalier and Curhan 1976). Manufacturers claim that trade 
promotions only increase the profits of retailers. Interestingly, retailers don’t deny using 
trade promotions to shore up their profits (Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland 2001). According 
to researchers out of the $75 billion dollars spent on trade promotions around 30% goes 
straight to the bottom line of the retailers (Kasulis et al. 1999). According to Abraham 
and Lodish (1990) only 16% of trade promotion deals are profitable for the manufacturer. 
 
Chevalier and Curhan (1976) looked at the problem from the retailers point of view and  
surmised that the impact of promotions on profit for the retailer may not be clear because: 
a) Profit per promoted item may be less than the non promoted item 
b) Increased sales of promoted items can be offset by reduced sales of the non 
promoted items 
c) Forward buying may be present and 
d) Customers drawn to the store by the promotions may actually end up buying more 
products which may increase profits. 
They also say that trade promotions may be favorable to retailers when they forward buy 
and not favorable to manufacturers when retailer promotions lead to reduced brand value. 
Similarly, promotions may be favorable to manufacturers and unfavorable to retailers 
when increased price cutting happens at the retailer level to prevent undercutting by their 
competitors. 
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Chevalier and Curhan (1976) while studying the trade promotions accepted by a retail 
chain came to the conclusion that trade promotions were quite profitable for the retailers. 
They however warned that if all the costs of trade promotions, like advertising, display 
set up, display rent etc were charged to promotions then the value of promotions might be 
negative. They also said that minus all expenses, the real benefits of trade promotions 
flowed to the retailers to the extent of forward buying that they indulged in. 
 
Abraham and Lodish (1987) developed an expert based system called PROMOTER to 
determine the value of trade promotions. They took data commonly available with a 
company and tried to determine the base level of sales when there is no promotion. This 
allowed them to determine the impact of various types of trade promotions. They 
calculated the profitability of the different trade promotions by first calculating the 
incremental profit. Then they subtracted the total cost of the promotion which they 
classified as belonging to one of two types: the variable cost of the promotion and the 
fixed cost of the promotion. They point out that the incremental units sold due to a 
promotion can be different from the total units sold on promotion. This means that even 
though a lot of products get sold due to the promotion, the total incremental benefit might 
be less or even negative if the base level of the sales are actually equal to the promoted 
sales level. Their attempt was similar to the attempt of Goodman and Moody (1970) who 
developed a system to measure the effect of trade promotions on sales of the 
manufacturer. Lucas (1996) mentions two proprietary studies, the first of which found 
that companies spending more than 60% of their total budget on promotions generate a 
significantly lower return on investment than those which spend a majority of their 
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budget on above line advertising. The second study using retailer scanner data suggested 
that the impact of trade promotions is short term and has little impact on the underlying 
base sales. 
 
Blattberg and Levin (1987) try a modeling approach to describe how retailers behave 
when offered trade promotions. They develop a model to (1) evaluate individual 
promotions, (2) to identify the best trade promotions for each size and in each 
geographical area, (3) to evaluate future promotional plans and (4) to develop trade 
promotion tactics. They make an important point that if promotions don’t increase 
consumer sales then they merely shift the timing of the retailers purchase. Empirically 
they find that trade promotions do not pay out for the manufacturers, a finding also 
corroborated by Lucas (1996). It seems from the studies that the better the evaluation 
method, the more money the manufacturer seems to loose (Kruger 1987). 
Trade Promotion Success Factors 
  
Researchers have speculated about the likely factors that lead to successful trade 
promotions. Some of the research have been conceptual (Mitchel 1985; Quelch 1983) 
while others have used survey methodology (Hardy 1986) to elaborate on what 
constitutes key success factors. Hardy (1986) contended that to determine success, first 
the objectives of the promotion have to be specified. Only after that, can the significant 
antecedents to achieving those objectives be specified and tested. He lists the main 
objectives of trade promotion as: 
a) Achieving short term volume 
b) Achieving long term market share 
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c) Building Trade inventories 
d) Increasing Consumer trials 
He proposed that all these objectives can be predicted by promotion period, promotion 
cost, trade support, presence of competitive promotions, level of incentives, and the 
presence of consumer promotions alongside trade promotions. He found that achieving 
trade support to be the most critical factor for achieving the objectives of the firm, a point 
that has been raised by other researchers (Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Kopp and Greyser 
1987). Hardy (1986) also did a qualitative study and found that in the view of managers, 
trade promotions succeeded only when there were high incentives, good trade support, 
good sales force support and there is absence of competitive activity. In his view, the 
reasons for unsuccessful trade promotions were build-up of inventory from previous 
deals, insufficient incentives, competitive promotions and lack of trade support. 
 
Quelch (1983) made suggestions as to what can be done to improve promotion 
effectiveness. Among the important suggestions were 1) changing management 
orientation from a short term to long term, 2) changing the evaluation of salespeople from 
sales based to profit based, 3) improving promotion designs with different discount rates 
for leader vs. the follower brands and 4) changing the timing of promotions to prevent 
retailers from buying deal to deal. 
 
Walters (1989) conducted an empirical investigation to determine the level of retailer 
trade support. He delved deeper into Hardy’s (1986) assertion that trade support is the 
most critical factor for achieving success in trade promotions. Since there are lots of trade 
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promotions on offer at any point in time, retailers can offer significant support to only a 
small number of trade deals (Chevalier and Curhan 1976). Walter’s found empirical 
evidence to suggest that economic incentives contained in deals like advertising support, 
price reductions and product displays significantly affect retailer support of trade deals. 
He also found that time since the last promotion in the same category also has an impact 
on the retailer support. He however didn’t find any evidence to suggest that product 
related factors (like store sales rank of product category and product- sales rank in 
category), manufacturer’s consumer promotions and the price elasticity of product in the 
deal had any significant impact on the trade support. This finding that consumer 
promotions had no impact on trade support is surprising since the conventional wisdom 
says that retailers would be more willing to provide trade support when deals are 
accompanied with consumer promotions. It also contradicts the findings of Hardy (1986) 
who found evidence that consumer promotions running simultaneously with trade 
promotions does have an impact on the success of trade promotions.  
 
Explaining Trade Promotions as a Power Game  
 
Researchers have tried studying trade promotions as a sort of prisoner’s dilemma game. 
A prisoner’s dilemma game in game theory means that there is one best strategy for a 
firm irrespective of what the competitor does (Rao, Arjunji, and Murthi 1995). This type 
of conceptualization has lead to fatalistic views about trade promotion, namely, “it’s a 
cost of doing business”. This kind of view has in turn lead to lessening focus on 
improving the productivity of trade promotion; with the result that it has become a self 
fulfilling prophesy. Rao, Arjunji, and Murthi (1995) have tried modeling trade 
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promotions as a series of competitive games and have hypothesized the actions of the 
actors depending on a series of promotion outcomes. For example they predict that if a 
promotion is profitable regardless of what the competition does, then it is a prisoner’s 
dilemma game and both parties end up promoting. On the other hand if promotion is 
profitable only if competitor doesn’t promote, then the game type is “battle of sexes” and 
it is not possible to go without promotions over a long period of time. They also 
empirically try to demonstrate that promotion activity seems to be independent of 
competitor actions. Meaning competitors don’t necessarily choose their promotion 
actions after taking into account the actions of their competitors. 
 
Kasulis et al.(1999) look at trade promotions as a result of power game between the 
manufacturer and the retailer. They look at the relative power between the two parties to 
hypothesize the use of different forms of trade promotions that have different objectives. 
They make a conceptual framework consisting of a two by two matrix (high-low) of 
retailer and manufacturer power. They propose that when the retailer is in a dominant 
power position we should observe promotions which shift channel profit from the 
manufacturer to the retailer. Examples of such promotions are bill backs, slotting fees, 
inventory financing etc. In the case when the supplier is more powerful than retailers the 
supplier sees little point in offering trade deals to the retailers. Instead they focus on 
doing consumer promotions that increase customer loyalty. In the symmetric case when 
both the retailer and supplier are strong he proposes that we should see a higher incidence 
of promotions like coop advertising, display advertising and calendar marketing 
agreements. Last in the weakly symmetric case where both the retailer and the supplier 
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are weak in market attractiveness where both the parties are in survival mode, they are 
likely to use promotions that result in temporary price cuts that are passed to the 
consumers. Kasulis et al. (1999) don’t test their propositions as they claim (rightly) that 
data implied by their propositions are likely to be considered proprietary and very 
difficult to obtain using normal survey methodology.  
 
Inefficiencies of Trade Promotion 
Researchers have long been concerned that trade promotions adds costs that get passed 
on to the ultimate consumer. Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) calculated that trade 
promotion adds 0.5% - 1.1 % to total retail prices. The key to calculating these costs is 
the fact that trade promotion (especially price promotion) has a very distinct impact on 
retailer behavior. Trade promotions lead to a phenomenon called forward buying, where 
retailers take advantages of lower prices to forward buy for later sales at normal prices 
(Blattberg and Levin 1987; Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon 1990). The retailers have a 
motivation to forward buy till the savings from the lower prices are equal to the holding 
costs. Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) calculated the holding costs to be around 30% 
which includes the handling, storage and capital charges. They also estimate that for the 
food industry, “increase in manufacturer and distributor costs constitutes around 2.5% of 
the total retail sales, including the costs of administering promotional programs” pg 141.  
 
The point that Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) make is that trade promotion leads to 
two bad effects: 1) It leads to distrust between the manufacturer and distributor which 
could lead to higher transaction costs (Williamson 1975) and 2) Forward buying leads to 
wasteful expense of storage and diversion which helps no one in particular.  
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Also the cost burden of trade promotions is not borne by everyone in equal measure. 
People who are classified as “cherry pickers” (bargain hunters) end up getting a lower 
price, while normal brand loyal consumers end up paying the higher prices (Buzzell, 
Quelch, and Salmon 1990). Therefore the loyal consumers end up subsidizing the non-
loyal consumers, which is bad for the manufacturers in the long run.  (Buzzell, Quelch, 
and Salmon 1990) suggest EDLPP (everyday low purchase price) as a possible solution 
to reducing the incidence of forward buying. In a similar vein Lucas (1996) mentions that 
United States retailer scanner data proves that the impact of trade promotion is short term 
and has a very little impact on the company’s base line sales volume. They also suggest 
that incremental volume mainly comes from brand switchers rather than loyalist, echoing 
the views of Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon(1990). 
 
Nelsin, Powell, and Stones (1995) develop a dynamic optimization model to demonstrate 
that a manufacturer’ optimal allocation of resources to advertising and trade promotions 
depends on the consumer response to retailer promotions, retailers inventory carrying 
cost and retailer pass-through behavior. They also hypothesize about a world in which 
there is no forward buying. They suggest that in a world without any forward buying, 
companies would be required to spend more on steeper trade promotions with lesser 
frequency.  They assert that forward buying is a barrier that holds back effective use of 
trade promotion. 
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Till 1995 the literature had held that forward buying adds inefficiency to the channel 
system and the manufacturer is always worse off. All trade deals were considered 
unprofitable as the retailers forward buy and keep the promotion to themselves. Lal, 
Little, and Villas-Boas (1996) challenge this deeply held belief about the impact of 
forward buying on profits. They model the behavior of manufacturers, retailers and 
consumers and find that in equilibrium, manufacturers are better of with allowing 
forward buying than not allowing forward buying. The intuition behind their surprising 
result is that allowing retailers to forward buy reduces the intensity of competition 
(between manufacturers) which helps the manufacturer. They also mention that forward 
buying does lead to decreased income for the manufacturer as retailers always buys 
inventories at lower cost, but they are still better than the prices that would have resulted 
in the case when there is no forward buying and higher intensity of competition. 
 
Having demolished the conventional wisdom that forward buying is always bad they do 
acknowledge that forward buying does have a negative impact on total channel costs. 
Forward buying creates serious logistical dysfunctions leading to excess storage of 
inventory which creates inventory storage costs. Furthermore, the boom and busts of 
inventory movement called the bullwhip effect, (Ailawadi, Farris, and Shames 1999) has 
an impact on the production schedules of the manufacturers who are unable to run their 
plants in a smooth manner which adds costs to the manufacturing process.  
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Improving Trade Promotions 
Researchers have made considerable efforts to try and suggest ways in which trade 
promotion inefficiencies can be removed and better use can be made of trade dollars. 
Some of the most common suggestions has been EDLPP, Scan backs, electronic-forward 
buys etc. The research has concentrated on proving the effectiveness of the new 
suggested methods over the old ones.  Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) were possibly 
the first researchers to suggest a policy for EDLPP to reduce the costs of running trade 
promotions. They suggested that the retailer should purchase on an as-needed basis and 
should be offered a weighted average price reflecting both the deal price and the 
promoted price. They suggested that EDLPP would have three benefits. First it will 
prevent inventory buildup for both manufacturers and retailers, second it will reduce 
selling and administration expenses as retailers would spend less time negotiation trade 
deals and third it would lead to a more collaborative relationship between the retailer and 
the manufacturer as they will be freed from the zero sum game where one party wins only 
at the expense of the other. They also believed that following EDLPP leads to more pass 
through thereby leading to lower prices for the consumers. 
 
Nelsin, Powell, and Stones (1995) mention decreasing pass-through, increasing 
promotion intensity and increased retailer warehousing ability (which allows forward 
buying) as reasons for the move towards EDLPP by manufacturers. They also say that 
consumer factors may be preventing a wholesale move towards EDLPP. They mention 
that consumer response to deals is still intact and it seems that media advertising is 
becoming less effective. Therefore these factors are having an opposing effect on 
adoption of EDLPP. It has been speculated that promotional elasticities might far exceed 
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the price elasticities, in that case the EDLP strategy becomes questionable (Blattberg, 
Briesch, and Fox 1995). Their advice to mangers was to keep a higher shelf price and 
then offer discounts to generate more sales and profits. 
 
Zerillo and Iacobucci (1995) offer some suggestions to improve the trade promotion 
benefits in the long run. They suggest that trade promotion deals should be structured 
with the following guidelines 
1) No trade promotions to be allowed that does not require the retailer to add value 
to the overall channel. They basically suggest that pure price-off deals which 
don’t involve any performance by the retailer should be discouraged. 
2) Trade promotions should be designed to reward actions which tend to reduce the 
overall cost of the channel. 
3) Shift the burden of performance proof to the retailers through the use of rebate 
plans. 
4) In the case where there is no option but to use quantity discounts, the focus should 
be to provide quantity discounts on a retrospective basis (i.e. allotments made on 
past performance) Zerillo and Iacobucci (1995) claim that using such a system is 
more equitable and also stops practices like forward buying and diverting. 
 
While quite a few authors had praised EDLPP as a solution for deal to deal forward 
buying, Ailawadi, Farris, and Shames (1991) claimed that EDLPP is a pretty strong 
medicine and may cause its own side effects. They also decry the tendency by 
manufacturers to blame trade promotions by stating that in the absence of trade 
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promotions they would have to charge much less than their current list prices, basically 
agreeing with the stand of Lal, Little, and Villas-Boas (1996). They, however, take a 
different view on how to improve trade promotion. They diagnose that the main problem 
with trade discounts is that they are linked to quantity bought. This encourages forward 
buying and creates problems with pass though. They suggest that the goal of the 
manufacturer should be to design trade promotions is such a way that it increases total 
channel profit. They suggest and demonstrate through an analytical model (consisting of 
one retailer and one supplier) that linking promotional allowances based on the list price 
charged by the retailer increases total channel profit. The intuition behind their thinking is 
that if the retailer is encouraged to charge a lower price (as the total allowance is 
dependent on the price charged to the consumer), then the total base demand would go up, 
which would help both the retailer and the manufacturer as the total channel profit 
increases. The only hitch with their proposal might be the Robinson-Patman act which 
prevents manufacturers from price discrimination when it reduces competition. However, 
in their paper they claim that manufacturers have described their suggestions as being 
consistent with the relevant provisions of the Robinson-Patman act.  
 
Another problem that has plagued the effective implementation of trade promotion is 
retail pass through. This occurs due to a phenomenon called “retailer opportunism” 
(Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland 2001). Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland (2001) state that while the 
manufacturer would like the retailer to pass on the trade promotion money to the 
consumer as reduced prices every time, the retailer does not do so because of information 
asymmetry. The consumer has no way of knowing when the manufacturer has provided a 
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trade promotion. If the retailer never passes on a trade promotion, then the consumer can 
become suspicious and can take their business elsewhere. However, the retailer resolves 
this problem by occasionally charging a lower price when the trade promotion is on and 
charging a normal price on other occasions. Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland (2001) 
demonstrate through an analytical model that this actually is the optimal strategy for the 
retailer. This analytical finding is consistent with the findings of previous empirical 
findings of Walters (1989) and Curhan and Kopp (1987). They also suggest and 
demonstrate that when manufactures advertise their ongoing trade promotions directly to 
the consumers it can increase retail pass through thus reducing retailer opportunism.  
 
The move towards eliminating forward buying has led to the creation and advocacy of a 
new type of trade promotion, the “scan back” which have increasingly become popular 
among manufacturers (Ailawadi 2001). The mechanism of the scan back is that the 
retailer is paid the promotion money only when the product is actually sold to the final 
consumer (which can be tracked by the scanned sales during the promotion period) and 
not on the amount of product bought. This effectively prevents any forward buying 
because if the retailer buys extra during the promotion period it is to the retailer’s 
disadvantage. This scan back scheme has been promoted as the panacea for trade 
promotion ills by the manufacturers. Dreze and Bell (2003) using an analytical model 
prove that when the terms of trade are identical (base size, deal size and deal duration) 
then manufacturers would always prefer scan back and retailers would always prefer off-
invoice. Now considering that scan backs do have benefits in terms of reducing forward 
buying (which adds cost to the overall channel system) they suggest that the only way 
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manufacturers can convince retailers to consider moving to scan backs is to compensate 
them for the loss of profit opportunities caused by moving to scan backs. To prove that 
such a system is possible, Dreze and Bell (2003) devise a modified scan back (which they 
call a mimic scan back) which leaves the retailer weakly better off and the manufacturer 
strictly better off. Thus they create a sort of win-win solution for both parties. They 
propose that to create a mimic scan back, the manufacturer has to provide a smaller deal, 
but for a longer period of time and also lower the base price of the product. They also 
find empirical evidence for scan backs leading to more retail pass-throughs and lower 
retail prices consequently resulting in higher sales.  
 
One way suggested for improving the practice of forward buying is by instituting a 
system of virtual forward buying, whereby trade promotions deliveries are made in a 
staggered manner so as to minimize the capital and storage costs. This method of virtual 
forward buying can lead to greater efficiency for both the manufacturer and the retailer 
while keeping intact the practice of forward buying (Poddar and Donthu 2007).  
 
Identifying Problems with Trade Promotions 
Managers and academics have long believed that trade promotions create more problems 
than they solve. Mohr and Low (1993) in a conceptual paper tried to summarize the main 
problems. According to them: 
1) Trade promotions create adversarial trade relationships 
2) Trade promotion spending fuels competitive retaliation 
3) Trade promotions steals funds from advertising 
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4) Trade promotions devalues the brand image/ consumer franchise 
 
Zerillo and Iacobucci (1995) suggest that trade deals can have negative effects on the 
performance of the manufacturer in the short as well as long run. First, the payment of 
trade deals can increase the price of products in the marketplace, leading to an overall 
decrease in the demand. Second, the retailer seeing the increasing market price can 
actually enter the market with private brands thus the manufacturer may end up creating 
its own competitors. Third, due to the high inter retailer competition retailers may 
become more aggressive when it comes to demanding more trade deals and thus reduce 
the trust between the retailer and the manufacturer. Fourth, due to the high fluctuations in 
the market price, consumer may become more price conscious and become constant deal 
seekers. Finally as manufacturers dedicate more money towards trade promotions, their 
ability to create brand differentiation would decrease over time. This would have a long 
term impact on the ability to charge a premium from consumers for the brand. 
 
Zerillo and Iacobucci’s (1995) thoughts were along the lines of empirical findings by 
(Dodson, Tybout, and Sternthal 1978; Shoemaker and Shoaf 1977; Strang 1975). 
However, the long term effects of promotions still remains a debatable point (Blattberg, 
Briesch, and Fox 1995) as there are some researchers who have failed to find a long term 
negative impact of promotions (Johnson 1984; Neslin and Shoemaker 1989).  
 
Slotting Fees Controversy 
Retailers and wholesalers frequently require that manufacturers pay some sort of fees 
before they agree to stock a new product (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000). This 
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practice is called slotting fees. Therefore, although it is a form of trade promotion, its 
impact is not felt by mature products. According to Sudhir and Rao (2006) the amount of 
slotting fees varies from $1.4 - $2 million for a national level introduction of a single 
SKU. In 1990 the total value of slotting fees paid in the grocery industry only, was $9 
billion dollars. This amount was also estimated to be around 16% of new product 
introduction cost (Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon 2000).  
 
There has been a controversy on slotting fees, because researchers have not been able to 
agree as to what role slotting fees play in manufacturer-retailer relations. There are two 
main schools of thought who have held diametrically opposite views. The first school of 
thought is the “efficiency school”, which states that slotting fees actually increase 
efficiency in the system by: 
1. Providing a signaling mechanism for manufacturers to advertise product 
quality. This argument is similar to the argument advanced for advertising, 
which also is supposed to act as a signaling mechanism for consumers to 
determine product quality. 
2. Sharing risks between the retailer and the manufacturer. Since information 
asymmetry exits between retailer and manufacturer, an assumption is made 
that the retailer knows less than the manufacturer about the probability of 
success of the product. Therefore they share a disproportionate amount of risk 
during product introduction. Slotting fees helps maintain the balance by 
shifting the risk from the retailer to the manufacturer. 
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3. Helping efficient allocation of shelf space. In any retailer environment the 
demand for shelf space is always more than the supply and with retailers 
carrying a huge amount of SKU’s (average over 30,000) new products can 
only come in by displacing an older product. Therefore slotting allowances 
actually end up helping the retailer make efficient use of shelf space. A 
corollary to that is, slotting allowances helps totally new products break into 
the shelf space, which in the normal case they would not have been able to do 
as they were untested in terms of marketplace performance. finally 
4. Slotting allowances increase competition, thus reducing total retail prices. 
The efficiency school of thought is the favored one by retailers  who want 
slotting fees to continue.  
The other school of thought called “market power” argues that slotting fees are actually 
harmful and damages competition and overall consumer behavior by: 
a) Allowing retailers to use their market power to demand and obtain fees. They are 
thus able to demand more fees from smaller manufacturers. 
b) They undermine channel relationships, as manufacturers are bitter about being 
made to pay fees to get their product to the market. 
c) Allows a mechanism for price discrimination, when different manufacturers are 
made to pay differential fees, thereby increasing the costs disproportionately.  
d) Introduces unfair competition for certain manufacturers and retailers who unable 
to pay slotting fees just quit the market. And finally 
e) Slotting fees end up actually harming the consumer as the fees are ultimately 
passed on to the consumers in the form of higher list prices. 
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For an excellent review about slotting fees and the two schools of thought see Bloom et 
al.(2000). The argument about which school of thought is right is still unresolved. Bloom, 
Gundlach, and Cannon (2000) using a survey methodology found that retailers and 
manufacturers did not agree that slotting fees constitute a sort of signaling mechanism. 
They however did agree that slotting fees leads to shifting of risk from the retailer to the 
manufacturer. They found that both retailers and vendors agreed that slotting fees did 
benefit large manufacturers and lead to higher prices. Overall Bloom, Gundlach, and 
Cannon’s (2000) research seemed to agree with the power school of thought. However a 
recent paper by Sudhir and Rao (2006) have challenged the findings of Bloom, Gundlach, 
and Cannon (2000) and have suggested that the efficiency theories may actually be right. 
They thus found support for the FTC’s stand that slotting fees are not actually anti-
competitive. From the above discussion it seems that the jury is still out on this issue. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
From the first two chapters we can see that the problem of choice is a very important 
issue that has not been tackled much in the B2B channels area, more so in the trade 
promotions area. This dissertation is an attempt to understand decision choice under 
different power asymmetry contextual situations especially when the short term utilities 
are the same. This choice behavior is important to understand on a theoretical level as 
most researchers, while admitting that choice behavior is based on both economic and 
non-economic factors have tended to pit economic factors against the non-economic 
factors (Murry and Heide 1998) in an attempt to explain behavior. Not surprisingly they 
have found economic factors to dominate the non-economic factors. This is especially 
true in a business to business setting and adds very little to our further theoretical 
understanding. Economists have long established that a rational economic party would 
always choose an option that offers a higher economic benefit versus one with a lower 
economic benefit. This dissertation acknowledges this economic fact and asks the follow 
up question about how decision making happens when the short term economic factors 
are the same. 
 
As explained in the first chapter, retailers always face more choices in terms of trade 
promotions than they can accept. And since meeting the economic benefit offered by a 
trade promotion of a competitor is the easiest, we can be sure that there would be 
situations when a retailer would be required to choose from parity trade promotions 
offered by different vendors. This poses a particularly unique problem in the business to 
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business buying scenario. Since business to business buying takes place in an 
organizational environment all decisions are subject to post decisional reviews by the 
organization. Therefore all choices made by decision makers have to be justifiable (Vyas 
and Woodside 1984). When a product offering has a higher economic utility its 
probability of getting selected is very high, however when the product offerings are equal 
in utility, the problem of justifiability reduces considerably and other extraneous factors 
can be expected to play a big role in decision choice.  
 
When the retail buyer makes a choice among multiple vendors offering parity economic 
benefits in the trade deals, it can be said that the retail buyer is making a very strong 
behavioral commitment on behalf of the retailer. The retailer is making it known to the 
vendors whose promotions are not selected that even though their promotions matched 
the economic value offered by the winning promotion, they have decided to make a 
commitment to another party. This sort of behavioral commitment is very important to 
understand as it is bound to be much stronger than behavioral commitment that is based 
on pure economic benefit. 
 
In this dissertation we use psychological, economic and sociological antecedents to 
develop a causal model of behavioral commitment (Figure 1). We posit that a strong 
behavioral commitment is explained by psychological constructs like affective 
commitment and moral commitment. On the other hand the calculative/instrumental 
commitment is a rational economic behavior that explains choice in terms of the long 
term cost-benefit calculation of making the commitment. The sociological perspective 
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explains the choice in terms of the structural dimension, namely the structural 
relationship between the two parties (Stern and Reve 1980) which have been 
operationalized as the power asymmetry between the parties.  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model: Retailer Commitment Model 
 
 
Commitment theory provides the structure of the decision process, while the heuristic-
systematic model (Eagly and Chaiken 1993) explains the decision process. Both these 
theories combined allow us to understand the decision process that managers go through 
while deciding among parity options. Next, we will explain the literature on our 
dependent and independent variables and develop our hypothesis. 
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Behavioral Commitment 
The construct behavioral commitment has generally been used more in the sales literature 
and has been conceptually defined as the “extent to which an employee plans to continue 
membership with the current employer” (Kim 1999). Other researchers have defined it as 
propensity to leave, intent to quit and attachment (Halaby 1986; Kim 1999; Mowday, 
Porter, and Steers 1882; Price 1997). In organization research it has been defined as the 
tendency of engaging in particular lines of work because of the cost of doing otherwise 
(Becker 1960). However Meyer and Allen (1984) have argued that this definition is more 
like their definition of continuance commitment. Overall researchers have struggled with 
developing a meaningful and precise definition for behavioral commitment (Kim and 
Frazier 1997). Anderson and Weitz (1992) define behavioral commitment as a 
willingness to make short term sacrifices, while Kumar, Sheer, and Steenkamp (1995) 
define it as willingness to invest in the relationship. Kim and Frazier(1997) on the other 
hand define it as the extent to which a distributor provides special help to its supplier in 
times of need.  
 
As can be seen, there are numerous definitions of behavioral commitment and scholars 
have not been able to agree as to how behavioral commitment is actually different from 
the other dimensions of commitment. It therefore becomes important for us to define 
exactly what we mean by behavioral commitment. Previous researchers have not 
measured the actual behaviors, but have instead focused on willingness to make short 
term sacrifices and/ or investments (Kim and Frazier 1997).  
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In our research we try to get over the measurement problem by defining behavioral 
commitment as the attachment shown by a retailer to a particular vendor even when the 
particular vendor doesn’t offer any additional economic benefits, compared to its 
competitors. We further posit that behavioral commitment causally follows attitudinal 
commitment which has strong foundation in motivational theory (Ajzen 1991). 
According to the theory an individual’s behavior is a function of the intention to perform 
that behavior. This intention is in turn determined by two basic factors: a) attitude 
towards performing the act and b) the perception of the individual regarding the totality 
of the normative pressures concerning the behavior. This theory conceptualizes behavior 
as a function of the attitudes towards that behavior. A similar model of commitment has 
been used previously by Wiener (1982) who proposed that instrumental motivation 
(calculative motivation) and commitment (normative and affective motivation) determine 
organizational intentions and behaviors. 
Antecedents to Behavioral Commitment 
There exist many antecedents to behavioral commitment. The easiest and the most logical 
antecedent is one which takes the economic perspective. In this perspective behavioral 
commitment occurs because the decision maker makes a cost benefit comparison of the 
decision problem (Iverson and Roy 1994). The decision maker takes into account the 
likely benefits of making the commitment versus the cost of not doing so. This type of 
economic perspective has been defined by scholars (Kim and Frazier 1997; Meyer and 
Allen 1984) as calculative commitment.  
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The other antecedent to behavioral commitment takes the psychological perspective. This 
perspective challenges the economic explanation by focusing on the affective responses 
that retail buyers make towards the vendors. It recognizes that decision makers are not 
always the rational cold hearted decision makers as they are made out to be. They also 
have likes and dislikes and the principle of bounded rationality (Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997) ensures that decisions are not made taking into account all the information that is 
available to the retailer. Therefore non-economic factors like affect for the salesperson 
and affect for the company impact the decision making process.  
 
The final antecedent to behavioral commitment is based on the sociological perspective. 
The political structure of the dyad (Stern and Reve 1980) determines the behavioral 
interaction between them and the attachment between firms is based on structural ties that 
exist between the two focal firms (Geyskens et al. 1996). Power asymmetry is a very 
close proxy for the structural ties that exists between two firms. As Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp (1995) remark that just knowing the level of interdependence and dependency 
asymmetry between two parties allows an observer to make general baseline predictions 
about the nature of their relationship even if the said observer knows nothing “about the 
particular history of the channel relationship, the orientation or identity of the partners or 
the actions each firm has recently taken” (pg 353). 
Calculative commitment 
According to some researchers (Anderson and Weitz 1989) commitment is entirely 
cognitive and calculative. Calculative commitment (also known as continuance 
commitment) is generally believed to develop on the basis of an “economic rationale” 
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(Meyer and Allen 1984; Stevens, Beyer, and Trice 1978). It involves rational task 
oriented actions whose main goal is maintaining relationships due to a concern for 
instrumental gains. It is thought to be devoid of emotions and sentiments for the partner 
(Gilliland and Bello 2002). According to Gilliland and Bello (2002) calculative 
commitment is “the state of attachment cognitively experienced as a realization of 
benefits sacrificed and losses incurred if the relationship were to end”.  
 
It is believed that calculative commitment develops on the basis of two factors: the 
magnitude and/or the number of investments that individuals make and the perceived lack 
of alternatives (Allen and Meyer 1990). The investments that individuals make are also 
called site bets (Becker 1960) in the commitment literature. Side bets are anything of 
value that an individual has invested in (e.g. time, effort, money) that could be lost or 
considered worthless to the individual if that individual were to cease being part of an 
organization (Meyer and Allen 1984). When employees of a firm spend time and effort in 
learning a job skill that is not transferable to another organization, the employee becomes 
committed to their firm. Allen and Meyer (1990) say that the employee is in effect betting 
that the effort s/he put in will pay off in the long run. And to collect the bet the employee 
requires continued employment in the organization. According to Becker (1960) the 
employees continued employment is positively related to the magnitude and number of 
side bets that the employees recognize. If employees cannot recognize the side bets as 
existing then continuance commitment does not exist.  
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The side bets in organizational setting are transaction specific assets (TSA’s) (Heide 1994; 
Williamson 1975) which are assets that are not deployable in another relationship. In a 
channel setting a pledge can be thought of as a representing a side bet (Gilliland and 
Bello 2002). In the retail setting the presence of an efficient consumer response system/ 
just in time inventory arrangements with a particular vendor could be side bet that 
prevents a retailer from discontinuing its relationship with that vendor. It is to be noted 
that side bets or the presence of TSA’s in a retailer –vendor relationship is the exception 
rather than the rule. Retailers since they are dealing with hundreds, if not thousands of 
vendors cannot afford to create non-transferable assets with each of their vendors.  
 
Continuance or calculative commitment also depends on the lack of alternatives. For an 
employee the lack of employment alternatives increase the perceived costs associated 
with leaving the organization (Allen and Meyer 1990; Farrel and Rusbult 1981). 
Therefore if a retailer has only one major supplier who can provide a particular product 
then the commitment that the retailer shows towards that vendor can be called a 
calculative commitment. In this scenario calculative commitment appears to be very 
much like dependence (Emerson 1962). 
 
It is important to note here that this kind of continuance is only one form of continuance 
commitment. It has been referred to in the literature as negative cognitive commitment or 
locked-in continuance commitment (Sharma, Young, and Wilkinson 2006; Stebbins 
1970). It manifests itself when there are costs and penalties associated with switching 
firms.  
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The other form of calculative commitment has been called positive cognitive 
commitment. In literature this form of commitment is also labeled as “instrumental 
commitment”, “value based commitment” and “cognitive-instrumental motivation” 
(Caldwell, Chatman, and O'Reilly 1990). This type of value based commitment is based 
on a positive orientation towards a relationship and the calculus is forward looking 
(Sharma, Young, and Wilkinson 2006). It looks more at the benefits that the relationship 
would bestow in the future rather than the losses that might be incurred on leaving the 
relationship. Farrel and Rusbult (1981) explicate this type of calculative commitment in 
an employee setting, where the employee remains with the organization due to the likely 
rewards that s/he may encounter in the future namely the possibility of a promotion. 
Since in a trade deal scenario there is no relationship termination, we define and measure 
calculative commitment in the manner of instrumental commitment. In our study we will 
aim to hold negative calculative commitment constant so that it doesn’t affect the 
manipulation of power asymmetry. At the same time we will manipulate positive 
calculative commitment so that it acts as an orthogonal factor to power asymmetry. 
 
Since calculative commitment occurs when there is profit associated with continued 
participation, the general impact of calculative commitment on intention to continue the 
relationship is positive in nature. Therefore if retailers feel that a particular vendor’s trade 
promotions are bound to increase in the future, that retailer would try to maintain and 
enhance his relationship with that vendor. However some researchers (Kumar, Hibbard, 
and Stern 1994) have suggested that calculative commitment has a negative impact on a 
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dealers desire to stay in the relationship as intermediaries high in calculative commitment 
always seek to develop alternatives to the suppliers. The intuition behind this 
counterintuitive argument is that since calculative commitment is based purely on 
economic or extrinsic concerns, this type of commitment is rather shallow or short lived. 
In the trade promotion context retailers thus are always looking for vendors who can 
ensure that their profit from trade promotions remains intact in the event that their 
preferred vendor decides to withdraw trade deals.  
 
Also Meyer and Allen (1991) have hypothesized that calculative commitment is also least 
likely to correlate positively with performance. One reason for this kind of 
counterintuitive hypothesis is that since calculative commitment has been defined in a 
manner that is very close to dependence; as the dependence of a party increases that party 
tries to minimize it by using dependence balancing (Emerson 1962). However as we 
define calculative commitment to be conceptually and structurally different from 
dependence, we believe that calculative commitment has a net positive impact on trade 
promotion selection. We therefore hypothesize: 
H1: Increased calculative commitment of the retailer with the target vendor would 
increase the overall behavioral commitment that the retailer demonstrates towards 
the target vendor’s trade promotions. 
 
Loyalty commitment 
According to Allen and Meyer (1990), there are basically three states of attitudinal 
commitment: Calculative, Affective and Normative. We must note that these are states 
and not types of commitment as people experience each of these psychological states to 
varying degrees. To classify them as types of commitment would mean that they are 
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mutually exclusive to each other. Becker (1960) has argued that affect plays a minimal 
role in the conceptualization of commitment. However most other researchers believe 
that affect plays a very important role in understanding commitment (Arndt 1979; 
Bennett and Gabriel 2001; Morgan and Hunt 1994). These researchers believe that the 
most common approach to organizational commitment is one where commitment is 
considered an affective or emotional attachment to the organization (Allen and Meyer 
1990). Allen and Meyer (1990) define affective commitment as “an employee’s 
emotional attachment to, identification with and involvement in the organization”. In the 
channel setting affective commitment has been conceptualized as the level of unity 
present in the channel relationship (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Stern 1986). Affective 
commitment is basically conceptualized as commitment to the goals and values of an 
organization for its own sake apart from its pure instrumental worth. In terms of trade 
promotions it would mean an affect for the vendor after controlling for the value of trade 
deals offered by that vendor. 
 
While affective commitment doesn’t flow from any instrumental worth, researchers have 
argued (Arndt 1979; Bennett and Gabriel 2001) that sometimes affective motives are 
much stronger and effective in developing longer lasting relationships than motives that 
are based on avoiding switching costs or lack of alternatives. According to Gilliland and 
Bello (2002) while a firm committed out of economic motives could readily break its 
relationship when a better deal is offered, a firm committed out of affect and obligation is 
less likely to do so. Therefore retailers who have affect for the vendors are less likely to 
look at trade deals offered by other vendors.  
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That leads us to define commitment which is based on obligation, also called moral 
commitment or normative commitment (Allen and Meyer 1990). Normative commitment 
refers to the feeling of obligation to stay with an organization or partner (Allen and 
Meyer 1990; Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994). According to Allen and Meyer (1990) 
moral commitment is viewed as a belief about one’s responsibility to an organization. 
Individuals exhibit commitment behaviors solely because they believe it is the right and 
moral thing to do. Individuals who feel normative commitment stay with an organization 
because they feel “they ought to”, in contrast to calculative commitment where they feel 
“they have to” and affective commitment where “they want to”. 
 
The main problem with normative commitment is that it is not readily distinguishable 
from affective commitment when measured. These two types of commitment seem to 
have some overlap in terms of measurement, although both are independent of calculative 
commitment (Allen and Meyer 1990). Also it has been speculated that normative/moral 
commitment may be more prevalent and exist as a separate construct from affective 
commitment in cultures where there is greater focus on obligation (Sharma, Young, and 
Wilkinson 2006).  Dawson, Young, and Wilkinson (1997) in (Sharma, Young, and 
Wilkinson 2006) state that commitment has different meanings and subsequently 
implications in China than in Europe. This is because of cultural and psychic differences 
across cultures (Ford 1984; Sousa and Bradley 2006). Gilliland and Bello (2002) merge 
the two concepts of affective and normative commitment together and call it loyalty 
commitment. According to them loyalty commitment is “the state of attachment to a 
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partner experienced as a feeling of allegiance and fruitfulness that is not simply based on 
economic motivations” In their study they find that firms find loyalty commitment to be 
more “descriptively accurate than commitment based on just friendship or obligation.” In 
our study we adopt the concept of loyalty commitment as articulated by Gilliland and 
Bello (2002) as a proxy for affective and normative commitment.  
 
Researchers have argued that since affective commitment is not based on instrumental 
gains, sometimes highly relational partners do forgo short term gains in anticipation of 
equitable treatment in the long run (Gilliland and Bello 2002; Ring and Van de Ven 
1994). In the channel context it has also been argued (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994) 
that dealers with high affective commitment demonstrate higher willingness to stay as 
well as greater willingness to invest in the relationships. Therefore retailers are likely to 
prefer trade promotions from vendors for whom they have higher affective commitment. 
Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) also demonstrate that affective commitment has the 
strongest positive association with the beneficial consequences of commitment followed 
by moral commitment and only then by calculative commitment. We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
H2: Increased loyalty commitment of the retailer with the target vendor would 
increase the overall behavioral commitment that the retailer demonstrates towards 
the target vendor’s trade promotions. 
 
Two forms of Loyalty Commitment 
While the organization commitment literature has treated affective commitment as a 
unidimensional construct, some researchers have claimed that business to business 
relationships are much more complex. According to Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) there 
 55 
are two distinct actors when we talk about an exchange partner: The partner’s overall 
organization and the partner’s sales representative. Therefore buyers develop 
relationships with the selling firms on two levels: loyalty to the selling firm(also called 
organizational commitment) and the loyalty to the salesperson (also called personal 
commitment) (Johnson, Barksdale Jr., and Boles 2001; Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp 
2007; Tellefsen and Thomas 2005).  
 
According to Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp (2007) researchers have not usually 
differentiated between the two loyalties when measuring loyalty to the firm, instead they 
have ended up measuring the two concepts as one. According to them this is a mistake 
and deceptive as the loyalty that the firm enjoys could be composed entirely of sales-
person loyalty elements and if the salesperson were to ever defect, the loss of the 
salesperson “owned” loyalty can leave firms vulnerable. Palmatier, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp (2007) also claim that loyalty to the salesperson should be treated 
independently from the loyalty to the organization as the buyer could have more loyalty 
to salesperson than the selling firm (Johnson, Barksdale Jr., and Boles 2001). 
 
As discussed in the earlier section the effect of organizational loyalty on behavioral 
commitment is well accepted by researchers (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994). 
Researchers claim that loyalty to the selling firm generates positive financial outcomes 
for the selling firm (Palmatier, Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007; Zeithaml, Berry, and 
Parasuraman 1996) and commitment to the selling firm has a direct and negative impact 
of the customers intention to defect (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Similarly we would argue 
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that when the retailer believes that the vendor is interested in partnering with the retailer 
to increase sales through trade promotions rather than going directly to the consumer 
using consumer advertising it develops goal congruity between them and it would 
increase the behavioral commitment that the retailer shows towards the vendor. 
 
Kumar, Sheer, and Steenkamp (1995) state that whenever affective commitment is felt to 
be high between two firms the bonds characterizing the channel relationship is going to 
be strong in both the business and personal arena. Johnson, Barksdale Jr., and Boles(2001) 
argue that buyer commitment to the salesperson should play an important role in the 
buyers decision making process. The reason provided is that the buyers generally have 
more contact with salesperson and that buyers may consider the salesperson to be 
synonymous with the vendor.  Researchers have found that strong buyer- salesperson 
relations increases repurchase intentions (Jones, Mothersbaugh, and Beatty 2000) and 
buyer commitment to salesperson is negative related to buyer defection intentions 
(Johnson, Barksdale Jr., and Boles 2001). Also commitment to vendor salesperson has a 
positive impact on financial outcomes and sales growth of the buyer’s firm (Palmatier, 
Scheer, and Steenkamp 2007). 
 
In the trade promotion arena also researchers have argued for a similar effect. Murry and 
Heide (1998) hypothesize that interpersonal attachments are likely to increase the 
likelihood of retailer participation in trade promotion deals. They based their hypothesis 
on early work by Adams (1976)and Salancik (1977) who suggested that strong 
interpersonal relationships increase participation. The intuition behind this is that “strong 
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interpersonal relationships reflects prior selection and/or socialization between parties” 
(Murry and Heide 1998) and these processes end up aligning the goals of the parties, 
which for the retailer would mean an increase in bottom line performance from the trade 
promotion and for the vendor would be an immediate increase in sales.  
 
From the above discussion we therefore hypothesize that:  
H3: Increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor’s 
salesperson would increase the overall behavioral commitment that the retailer 
demonstrates towards the target vendor’s trade promotions. 
 
H4: Increased organizational commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor 
would increase the overall behavioral commitment that the retailer demonstrates 
towards the target vendor’s trade promotion. 
 
 
Interaction Effects of Calculative Commitment and Affective Commitment 
 
So far in the dissertation our main focus was on how calculative commitment and 
different types of affective commitment have an impact on the decision making process 
of the retailer. We have focused only on the main effects of each mechanism. However in 
real life these factors are likely to manifest themselves in different combinations (Murry 
and Heide 1998). Therefore in this section we will hypothesize about various interaction 
effects that are likely to occur.  
 
It is important to note here that calculative commitment is an organizational level 
independent variable, meaning that calculative commitment has an impact on behavioral 
commitment of the retailer independent of the buyer’s personal viewpoint about the 
relationship. However the affection that the buyer feels towards the vendor’s salesperson 
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or the vendor could be due to the fact that the buyer gets a feeling that the vendor has 
goal congruity with the buyer (Murry and Heide 1998). The buyer may feel that the 
vendor helps meet the personal goals of the buyer, which could be the primary reason 
why he feels affect in the first place. Thus loyalty commitment could represent “utility in 
its own right and be a functional substitute” (Murry and Heide 1998) to calculative 
commitment. The buyer could use the two forms of loyalty commitment to actually 
minimize the impact of calculative commitment.  
 
In other words if the buyer feels commitment to the vendor salesperson or to the vendor 
himself, he should discount the effect of any calculative commitment that may exist. The 
overall effect would be that the impact of calculative commitment would reduce in the 
face of high loyalty to the vendor salesperson or loyalty to the vendor organization. 
 
Therefore we can hypothesize that: 
H5a: Increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor’s 
salesperson would decrease the positive effect that calculative commitment has on 
the behavioral commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor’s trade 
promotions. 
 
H5b: Increased organizational commitment of the retailer towards the target 
vendor would decrease the positive effect that calculative commitment has on the 
behavioral commitment of the retailer towards the target vendor’s trade 
promotions 
 
 
 
Direct and Moderating Effects of Power Asymmetry 
 
Researchers have long suspected that power plays a very important role in explaining 
relationships in marketing channels. Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson (1995) in a pioneering 
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study claimed that in marketing channels, power and its usage can have a “pivotal 
impact” on working relationships. They also claimed that power plays a very important 
role in a very important aspect of relational exchange namely commitment. Other 
researchers have also come to the same conclusion. According to Boyle et al.(1992) a 
firms use of power in a channel setting does impact its partner’s views about 
relationalism in which as mentioned before, commitment plays a central role. This 
suggests that power could have a main effect on commitment towards the vendor’s trade 
promotion. Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson (1995) also suggested that there could also be 
moderating effects of power and especially power asymmetry on commitment and 
various channel performance measures. 
 
To explain the role that power or power asymmetry may play in explaining retailer 
behavior we must review how the construct of power has been defined in the literature 
and what theory suggests could be its impact on our identified dependent measure. 
Emerson’s (1962) view has more or less dominated the conceptual and empirical 
explication of the power construct (Dwyer 1980). According to Emerson (1962) the 
power of actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B, which can be 
potentially overcome by A. Emerson (1962) also linked power to the amount of 
dependence existing in the dyadic relationship, i.e. channel member A’s power over B is 
directly proportional to B’s dependence on A for scarce resources (Dwyer 1980) and 
inversely proportional to the availability of those resources outside the A-B relationship.  
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However this is not the only conceptualization of power that has been attempted. 
According to French and Raven (1959) power of A over B is due to the various sources 
of power that exist due to the relationship between A and B. If B perceives that A has the 
ability to mediate rewards for B, then A has reward power. If B perceives that A has the 
ability to mediate punishment for B, then A has coercive power. If B perceives that A has 
a legitimate right to prescribe behavior (e.g. in a franchise situation) then A has legitimate 
power. If B identifies with A then A has referent power and finally if B perceives that A 
has some special knowledge or expertise then A has expert power. For an excellent 
review of how power has been conceptualized we refer readers to Gaski (1984). 
 
However as mentioned before the dominant view in the literature has been that power is a 
function of the dependence levels and in this paper we stick to that view. Also most 
papers have tried to explain the impact of power using dependence as the proxy for 
power.   
 
Researchers have used three different approaches to conceptualizing dependence. First is 
the sales and profit approach developed by El-Ansary and Stern (1972) where they claim, 
the greater the percentage of sales and profit contributed by the source firm to the target 
firm, the greater the targets dependence on the source. Most researchers have used this 
approach when operationalizing dependence (Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz 1987; Brown, 
Lusch, and Muehling 1983; Kale 1986). Kale (1986) also included the expectation of the 
target firm about the future sales contribution of the source firm as an influencer of 
current dependence levels. The second approach used to operationalized dependence is 
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the role performance approach (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989) mainly used by Frazier 
(1983). According to this approach how well a source firm carries out its role in channel 
performance determines the dependence of the target firm. The third approach to 
operationalizing dependence is one proposed by Heide and John(1988). According to 
them a target firm’s dependence on a source firm is a function of the transaction specific 
assets invested by the target firm in the relationship which can’t be redeployed profitably 
in another relationship. This operationalization is very similar to the concept of 
calculative commitment and the theory of side bets (Becker 1960).  
 
We use the El-Ansary and Stern (1972) approach to conceptualizing dependence as it is 
the most widely used and offers us leeway in the way we can manipulate power 
asymmetry. The dependence approach as suggested by Heide and John(1988) is not used 
because of the lack of clarity as to how the operationalization is different from negative 
calculative commitment. Also it is much harder to operationalize in terms of dependence 
asymmetry. 
 
Having given a brief overview of the way power has been defined it is our goal here to 
try and understand how power affects behavioral commitment in the context of trade 
promotions. Unfortunately the literature doesn’t provide a clear-cut answer to this 
question (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989). From the literature we know that a target firms 
dependence on the source firm (in other word’s the power of the source firm) is related 
positively to the source firm’s level of control on the targets behavior (Anderson, Lodish, 
and Weitz 1987; Etgar 1976). Frazier (1983) finds that dependence is related positively to 
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inter-firm agreement on marketing strategy. On the other hand Brown, Lusch, and 
Muehling (1983) find that dependence is related negatively to the frequency of inter-firm 
agreements. According to Dwyer(1980) under asymmetrical distributions of power, 
weaker members of the dyad show less satisfaction and a negative attitude towards the 
rewards that may flow from a channel relationship. This is in consonance with the view 
of Gaski (1984) and  Kumar, Sheer, and Steenkamp (1995) that the existence of power 
asymmetry produces dyadic conflict. It also reflects the views of Walker (1972) that 
application of power leads to dissatisfaction on the part of those who are subjected to it, 
as an asymmetrical power scenario produces asymmetrical negotiations where the 
powerful party always dominates the bargaining (Dwyer and Walker Jr. 1981).  
 
According to Stern and Reve (1980) channel relationships that are asymmetric in 
dependence and power tend to be more dysfunctional and less trusting than symmetrical 
relationships. Also as the channel power asymmetry increases, the interests of the channel 
partners diverge (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) and it reduces the “structural 
impediments inhibiting the more powerful firm’s opportunistic behavior” (Kumar, Scheer, 
and Steenkamp 1995). Therefore increasing interdependence asymmetry reduces the trust 
and commitment in the relationship as trust and commitment are not thought to flourish 
in an asymmetric relationship (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). Emerson (1962) in 
his highly cited article also claimed that power asymmetry is inherently unstable as it 
encourages the use of power. Therefore the weaker party always undertakes “balancing 
operations” that reduce the power advantage. According to the bilateral deterrence theory 
(Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) the weaker party knows that stronger party can 
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take advantage of the situation therefore the weaker party tries to balance the power 
asymmetry. It does so by reducing its own dependence by increasing the alternatives 
available to it and/or by decreasing the value of its relationship with the partner. It can 
also strive to increase its partner’s dependence by either increasing its own value to the 
partner or by decreasing the partner’s alternatives (by say developing a monopoly over a 
technology or a product).  
 
From the above discussion it can be hypothesized that in the trade promotion context 
when the target vendor is more powerful (retailer is more dependent) then it is possible 
that the retailer could try and reduce its power imbalance by preferring the alternate 
vendor, especially in situations when the short term economic value offered by both 
vendors is the same.  
 
While most of the literature would tend to agree with the previous statement, there is no 
unanimity on the effect of power on behavioral commitment (Anderson, Lodish, and 
Weitz 1987; Etgar 1976; Frazier 1983). Relative power theory (Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp 1998) suggests that when a partner is less powerful then it would try to be as 
inoffensive as possible to the stronger party so as not to incite punitive actions from the 
stronger party. Therefore the weaker party would acquiescence to the stronger party. A 
similar effect is also proposed by the conflict spiral theory (Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp 1998) which proposes that when one party is clearly dominant, the less 
dominant party avoids punitive actions against the stronger party as it realizes that the 
gains from such actions is pretty low. Meaning, that increasing power asymmetry has a 
positive impact on behavioral commitment on the part of the weaker party. Therefore it is 
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possible that when the retailer is weaker than the vendor, the retailer would increase its 
behavioral commitment towards the target vendor’s trade promotions. We believe that the 
later view is more likely to prevail especially in a trade promotion scenario due to the fact 
that a more dependent party knows that repeated attempts in dependence balancing could 
lead to retaliation from the less dependent party. The weaker party also knows that since 
the stronger party is less dependent on it, it increases the probability of punitive actions 
(Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1998). We therefore hypothesize 
H6: When the target vendor is more powerful than the retailer, the retailer would 
increase its behavioral commitment to the target vendor’s trade promotions. 
 
While so far we have talked about the main effects of power asymmetry on behavioral 
commitment, in this section of the paper we will argue that power asymmetry also 
moderates the effect of calculative and loyalty commitment on behavioral commitment.  
Researchers (Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson 1995) have found that power asymmetry has 
a moderating impact on retailer commitment and performance. According to them, 
depending on the power asymmetry situation existing between the two parties’ different 
sources of power (mediated vs. non-mediated power) is used by the one party and that 
has differential impact on commitment generated in the other party. For example, when 
the vendor is more powerful it is more likely to use mediated power that would lead to 
more calculative commitment in the retailer. On the other hand, when power is 
symmetric or when the retailer is more powerful, the generally accepted behavior is for 
the vendor to use non mediated power which increases normative-commitment and 
decreases instrumental or calculative commitment.  
 
 65 
Recalling our discussion previously on calculative and loyalty commitment, we can say 
that while calculative commitment is considered fleeting in nature, loyalty commitment is 
considered more permanent. While intermediaries high in calculative commitment seek 
to develop alternatives, dealers with high affective commitment demonstrate a higher 
willingness to stay and invest in the relationship (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994). 
Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) also demonstrated that affective commitment to a 
supplier by an intermediary has the strongest possible association with the beneficial 
consequences of commitment followed by moral commitment and then only followed by 
calculative commitment. Literature seems to suggest that when power asymmetry is not 
taken into account, then affective or loyalty commitment has the greatest impact on 
behavioral commitment only then followed by calculative commitment. Therefore we 
propose that 
H7: When the vendor is less powerful than the retailer then the retailer’s loyalty 
commitment would be a stronger predictor of behavioral commitment towards the 
target vendor’s trade promotions than the retailer’s calculative commitment. 
 
 
However, the previous discussion also suggests that it might not be the case always and 
that linkages between the different forms of commitment do vary across power 
asymmetry conditions (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994). Wiener (1982) has suggested 
that calculative commitment could make a stronger contribution to behavior especially in 
cultural climates where there is a higher value on individual need gratifications and 
rational thinking and less focus on the affective side of relationships.  
 
Our goal here is to explain how buyers make the decision choice in the face of the 
persuasion attempts being attempted by the vendors to accept their trade promotions. We 
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use the Heuristic –Systematic model (Chaiken 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993) to 
hypothesize the effect of power asymmetry on the choice process. The HSM model helps 
researchers understand the choice process used by people. It tries to explain how people 
process information about given risks that are manifest in each decision (Griffin et al. 
2002). This model is one amongst the family of dual-process theories that explain choice 
behavior (Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken 1999).  
 
The HSM model posits that there are two primary modes of information processing. 
Systematic processing is effortful and involves a comprehensive scrutiny of all relevant 
information to form judgments. It is a comprehensive analytical orientation to 
information processing where the perceivers scrutinize a great deal of information before 
making a judgment.  Heuristic processing on the other hand is a cognitively less 
demanding process and requires fewer cognitive resources than systematic processing.  
 
Heuristic processing involves the use of extrinsic cues like source expertise and other 
simple decision rules to formulate judgments and decisions (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; 
Mitra 1995). Heuristics are learned on the basis of peoples past experiences and 
observations. Thus people using heuristic process might make their choices based on the 
previous encounters or shared experiences like reputations to make a decision.  
 
The key assumption of the HSM model is that people are cognitive misers (Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993; Taylor and Fiske 1978) who must be motivated to engage in systematic 
processing. People thus want to satisfy their goal related needs in the most efficient way 
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possible. This has also been labeled in the theory as the least effort principle, whereby 
people often shun systematic processing in favor of the less effortful heuristic mode. The 
next key principle of HSM is the sufficiency principle. The sufficiency principle states 
that people will always try and satisfy their motivational concerns and minimize their 
processing efforts (Griffin et al. 2002). What it means is that whenever people make a 
choice they are always concerned about whether the choice they made is the right one, at 
the same time if the choice is not important enough they do not want to spend much time 
and effort on the choice. People would like to make only that much effort to ensure that 
the choice that has sufficient validity. 
 
Combining these two principles of least effort and sufficiency imply that people would 
engage in greater amounts of systematic processing when the less effortful heuristic mode 
does not provide sufficient judgmental confidence. When an issue is important enough it 
motivates people to increase the desired level of judgmental confidence in the decision. 
This level of confidence cannot be provided by heuristic processing thus people use 
systematic processing. Eagley and Chaiken (1993) state that every person has a 
sufficiency threshold and an actual confidence level, both of which lie in the judgmental 
confidence continuum. Whenever the actual confidence level is higher than the 
sufficiency threshold the sufficiency principle holds that systematic processing would 
cease to operate. Although systematic processing requires greater cognitive resources it is 
generally more effective in increasing subjective confidence than heuristic processing 
(Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken 1999). 
 
 68 
If people can be made to feel more accountable for their judgments or made to feel that 
the consequences of a wrong judgment are severe then their sufficiency thresholds go up 
and they can be expected to exhibit greater amount of systematic processing 
(Maheswaran and Chaiken 1991). In other words if the motivation for a decision is high 
enough the person would rather spend more effort in doing systematic processing than 
going to the default option which is heuristic processing (Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken 
1999). It is well accepted in literature that when people are highly motivated, they 
scrutinize message relevant information in detail and generate more message-relevant 
thoughts (Kardes 1988; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983). According to Eagley and 
Chaiken (1993) among the many variables that increase motivation and foster more 
systematic processing are task importance, responsibility for message evaluation and 
accountability.  
 
In the trade promotion scenario, when the retailer is faced with a more powerful vendor 
which he doesn’t want to annoy, the retailer is motivated to think very carefully about the 
likely consequences of the decision and the sufficiency threshold is likely to go up. To 
ensure that a wrong decision is not made, the buyer is more likely to use systematic 
processing to increase the confidence level in his choice. Therefore the buyer is more 
likely to consider the costs and benefits of making the decision rather than relying solely 
on heuristics like reputation of the vendor (Maheswaran, Mackie, and Chaiken 1992) or 
the likeability of the vendor salesperson. A point to note here is that since the default 
action of any buyer is to use heuristic processing, when the vendor is less powerful, the 
retail buyer is not so much concerned about making a wrong judgment. Therefore he is 
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more likely to use heuristic processing to make the decision. This kind of effect was 
hypothesized in the previous hypothesis and also was based on previous empirical 
literature. In the scenario where the vendor is more powerful we can therefore 
hypothesize that: 
H8: When the vendor is more powerful than the retailer then the retailer’s 
calculative commitment would be a stronger predictor of behavioral commitment 
towards the target vendor’s trade promotions than the retailer’s loyalty 
commitment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
This chapter describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses. This chapter 
constitutes of three main sections. The first section explains the research setting and 
research design, and the second section describes the operationalization of the measures 
used.  The last section will provide insight in the data collection methods used and the 
sample characteristics. 
 
Research Design 
In our study the goal was to test the relationship between power asymmetry, two forms of 
loyalty commitment and calculative commitment on behavioral commitment. The goal 
was understanding the causal relationship between these variables. We used a scenario 
based experiment to test our hypotheses. According to Trochim (2001) to establish 
causality three conditions are required: 
a) Covariation: The impendent and dependent variables must covary with each other 
and the changes in the independent variable must lead to changes in the dependent 
variable. 
b) Temporal precedence: The change in the presumed causal variable must precede 
the presumed effect. 
c) No Plausible alternative explanation: The presumed cause must be the only 
reasonable explanation for changes in the dependent variable. 
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Compared to all approaches, experimental methods are the strongest in determining 
causality in research, because of the strong internal validity of experiments (Trochim 
2001). In an experiment we can effectively control for the effects of undesirable 
extraneous variables. Also, we can maintain the temporal precedence of the independent 
variables and manipulation of the independent variables allows us to observe the effects 
of those variables on the dependent variable. High Internal validity in experiments allow 
us to isolate the effects of the independent variables and allow us to measure their 
impacts more precisely (Cook and Campbell 1979). Finally, since the independent 
variables in an experiment are orthogonal to each other, the effects of each independent 
variable can be compared to each other. 
 
Experiments by their very nature are intrusive in nature and are contrived in an artificial 
environment (Trochim 2001) therefore they are criticized for their lack of external 
validity that limits its generalizability. However since our goal in this study is not to 
report on how decisions are taken in real life but how our theory stands up to empirical 
scrutiny, we felt that an experiment was the appropriate research methodology. 
 
We devised the experiment using a 2x2x2x2 between subjects factorial design. The study 
design include 2 Calculative Levels (high, null), 2 Organizational Commitment levels 
(high, null), 2 Personal Commitment levels (high, null), and 2 Power Asymmetry levels 
(Target vendor more powerful than the retailer, Target vendor less powerful than the 
retailer).  Sixteen different scenarios were created, one each for all the different levels of 
manipulation. The scenario tried to provide a glimpse of a real world situation that 
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respondents might face in a purchasing managers role and they were asked to respond to 
the scenario in a manner similar to what they would in real life. 
 
The research design is presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Experimental Design 
  Target Vendor A 
Option Power Asymmetry of 
Target Vendor with 
Retailer 
Calculative 
Commitment 
Loyalty 
commitment with 
Sales person 
Loyalty 
commitment with 
organization 
1 Vendor More Powerful High High High 
2 Vendor More Powerful High High Low 
3 Vendor More Powerful High Low High 
4 Vendor More Powerful High Low Low 
5 Vendor More Powerful Low High High 
6 Vendor More Powerful Low High Low 
7 Vendor More Powerful Low Low High 
8 Vendor More Powerful Low Low Low 
9 Retailer more Powerful High High High 
10 Retailer more Powerful High High Low 
11 Retailer more Powerful High Low High 
12 Retailer more Powerful High Low Low 
13 Retailer more Powerful Low High High 
14 Retailer more Powerful Low High Low 
15 Retailer more Powerful Low Low High 
16 Retailer more Powerful Low Low Low 
 
The scenario presented to the respondents was that the retailer is faced with two vendors 
who are providing an equal cash discount. The products being offered to the retailer are 
local brands that are perfectly substitutable with each other. What it means is that 
irrespective of what product is chosen, the overall sales of the retailer remain constant. 
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The retail buyer is asked to make a choice between giving the entire order to one vendor 
or distribute the order among the two vendors in any percentage he likes. 
 
There was, however, one issue that needed to be resolved before we could test our 
hypotheses. The issue was how to separate out the effect of power and calculative 
commitment. As discussed before in the previous section, the way power has been 
measured (using dependence of party A over Party B) is somewhat similar to the way 
calculative commitment has been operationalized. Therefore if Party A is dependent on 
Party B for say X units, then party A also is likely to lose X units if it breaks its 
relationship and thus party A has X units worth of calculative commitment towards party 
B. From the discussion it seems that due to the way it has been operationalized, 
dependence (the proxy of power) and calculative commitment are not orthogonal to each 
other. To find the real impact of these variables we made sure that our manipulations of 
calculative commitment and power are conceptually separate from each other. 
 
Solving Non-Orthogonality between Power and Calculative Commitment  
First we acknowledge that the problem occurs due to the way power has been measured 
in literature. Most empirical papers have measured power in terms of percentage of sales 
contributed by a party (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989). The logic behind this approach is 
the “dependence” criteria. If vendor A contributes 20% of your sales then you are 
dependent on vendor A and the dependence can be measured as 0.2. Also since power is 
considered to be equal to dependence (Emerson 1962), researchers would say that 
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Vendor A has power of 0.2 over the retailer. Generally the availability of resources 
outside the relationship is not incorporated in the measurement. 
 
Now the problem of non-orthogonality of power and calculative commitment can be 
explained by the following example. Suppose there are three parties, vendor A, vendor B 
and retailer C. Retailer C does business with both Vendor A and Vendor B. Let us 
assume that vendor A contributes 10% of retailer C’s sales and vendor B contributes 20% 
of retailer C’s sales. Therefore Vendor A has 0.1 power over retailer C versus Vendor B 
who has 0.2 power. From the above we can see that vendor B is more powerful and 
retailer C has more to lose by terminating its relationship with vendor B than with vendor 
A. Therefore retailer C will have more calculative commitment towards vendor B than 
vendor A. What we have demonstrated so far is that if power is measured or manipulated 
using only dependence then it also has an impact on the measurement of calculative 
commitment. Retailer C’s use of calculative commitment towards vendor B will always 
be positively associated with vendor B’s power over C. Therefore there is a confounding 
between these two variables. 
 
Similarly, power by itself has no impact on behavior. Taking the same earlier example, 
even though vendor B is more powerful and contributes 20% of the entire sales of 
Retailer C, we can’t predict whether Vendor B will be able to use power without 
considering the effect of countervailing power that Retailer C might have on vendor B. If 
for example Retailer C actually sells 50% of the entire sales of vendor B, then vendor B 
is more dependent on retailer C than vice versa. Therefore when understanding the effect 
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of power we have to look at the difference in power rather than the absolute level of 
power. 
 
We solve this problem in the following manner. Let’s take the same scenario with the 
same three parties. However this time we add some annual sales numbers also.  
i. Vendor A has sales of 100 billion 
ii. Vendor B has sales of 10 billion 
iii. Retailer C has sales of 10 billion 
Now lets also assume that both vendor A and B make sales of 2 billion (20% of retailer 
sales) each through Retailer C. Therefore Dca = Pac = 0.2 and Dcb = Pbc = 0.2 (retailer C 
is dependent on A and B for sales of 20% each) (Emerson 1962).  
 
Since the power of both the vendors on the retailer is the same we would expect that 
retailer C would behave the same towards both parties equally. However before making 
that kind of statement we have to also look at the asymmetry of power (Pac-Pca and Pbc-
Pcb) as that would be a better predictor of behavior that just power. Now Pca=0.02 
(retailer C sells only 2% of the entire sales of vendor A and therefore vendor A is only 
dependent on retailer for a value of 0.02) and Pcb = 0.2 (retailer C sells 20% of the entire 
sales of vendor B). Therefore the power asymmetry between vendor A and retailer C 
(Pac-Pca) is 0.18 and the power asymmetry between vendor B and retailer C (Pbc-Pcb) is 
zero.  
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Looking at the asymmetry of power we can say that Vendor A seems to have a 
asymmetrical relationship with Retailer C while Vendor B has a symmetrical relationship 
with Retailer C. We can thus make a logical conclusion that we are more likely to find 
the effects of power in the relationship between A and C rather than B and C. Since 
vendor A is much more powerful than retailer C especially when compared to vendor B, 
the retailer C is going to be more careful how it deals with vendor A rather than vendor B. 
 
To understand the intuition behind the math, consider only the relationship between 
Vendor A and Retailer C. Vendor A’s power over Retailer C is 0.2 and Retailer C’s 
power over vendor A is only 0.02. In this scenario we can see very clearly Vendor A is 
more powerful than Retailer C. What we have done here is reduce the power that retailer 
C has over Vendor A. We could have very well gone the other way and instead of 
reducing the power of C over A, increased the power of Vendor A over Retailer C by 
increasing the dependence of Retailer C on Vendor A. However the effects of increasing 
dependence of C on vendor A are different from our preferred method. If we increase the 
dependence of retailer C, then retailer C also has more to lose and it increases the 
calculative commitment that retailer C feels towards Vendor A. 
 
Now a doubt can be raised whether power still operates especially in situations where 
there is no danger of relationships being broken. This seems to be especially true in the 
trade promotion area, where even if a vendor’s trade promotion is not accepted it doesn’t 
imply that the vendor would break up the relationship.  
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Our answer to this doubt is that power still operates in such a scenario for two reasons. 
First, since power is the ability to influence even if there is no immediate relationship 
termination the weaker party knows that its dependence is more on the stronger party and 
rejecting the stronger party even though it offers equal economic benefits, would signal to 
the stronger party that the weaker party is not inclined to continue the relationship in the 
long run and may switch partners if another party comes along. And because the stronger 
party understands that it is stronger and is less dependent, repeated rejections would 
invite retaliation in the long run.  
 
Second, although there is no immediate danger of relationship termination if there is 
asymmetry of power, it increases the probability of retaliation from the stronger party. In 
our scenario Vendor A does much more business than Retailer C, therefore has a larger 
punitive capability than Retailer C (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1998). According to 
these researchers the existence of punitive capability with one party is also able to 
influence the actions of the weaker party. 
 
The point to note in our manipulation is that Retailer C is equally dependent on both A 
and B and therefore the maximum “calculative loss” that retailer C can endure is also the 
same, meaning that if the retailer were to calculate the maximum loss that s/he might 
incur by breaking the relationship with either vendor, s/he would be indifferent between 
the two parties. Therefore the calculative commitment of the retailer is equal for both 
vendor A and B.  However the power asymmetry is different and we will still get the 
impact of power. 
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Furthermore if vendor B wants to increase its power it has only the one option. It has to  
reduce its dependence on Retailer C by increasing sales to other retailers. Vendor B can 
also make retailer C sell more of its product, but if its overall sales don’t increase then the 
power symmetry will hold and vendor C will not be better off. 
 
Overall it seems that in the special case when the retailer is equally dependent on two 
vendors it is likely that the vendor with greater sales would be considered more powerful. 
Therefore in our trade dealing scenario, if P&G (one of the biggest consumer products 
companies) and another smaller vendor sells the same amount of products to a retailer 
then the retailer would consider P&G to be more powerful even though they are equally 
dependent on both. 
 
In our experiment we create a scenario that has this kind of power imbalance between the 
vendor(s) and the retailer, so that the measurement of calculative commitment is not 
contaminated by manipulation of power asymmetry. In our manipulation, we also 
incorporate the idea about the lack of availability of resources outside the relationship in 
the instrument to strengthen the power manipulation. For example, in the scenario when 
the vendor is more powerful not only will power asymmetry will be to its advantage, but 
also it will be positioned as controlling a major market share.  We can then manipulate 
calculative commitment in the manner that we had defined earlier, namely that 
calculative commitment looks more at the benefits that the relationship would bestow in 
the future rather than the losses that might be incurred on leaving the relationship.  
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Manipulations 
The basic scenario as discussed before consisted of a situation facing a purchasing 
manager. The purchasing manager is supposed to place an order for 5 million cases of 
non branded bubble wraps. The purchase manger generally offers the deal to whichever 
vendor has the biggest trade deal. However, in this month both the vendors are offering 
the same trade deal. The purchasing manager has to decide, whether to split the offer or 
provide the entire order to one party. In the different scenarios we manipulated power, 
calculative commitment, affective commitment to salesperson and affective commitment 
to the vendor organization. In the next few pages we describe how we achieved the 
manipulation of the different constructs. 
Manipulating Power 
We manipulate power asymmetry by having two extreme manipulations. The first case  is 
when the target vendor is more powerful than the retailer and the second where the target 
vendor is less powerful than the retailer. Since the retailer is supposed to choose between 
the two vendors in the scenario we will have an alternate vendor who would be equally 
powerful as the retailer and who would serve as the control group. Figure 2 provides the 
schematic of how power asymmetry will be manipulated: 
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Figure 2: Manipulation of Power Asymmetry 
 
 
Manipulating Calculative Commitment 
Calculative/instrumental commitment was manipulated by giving the user a high 
instrumental condition versus a null instrumental condition. A scenario that was used was 
that Vendor A (target vendor) is likely to give a year end bonus trade promotion for 
meeting yearly targets. Plus in the view of the retail buyer, vendor A is going to launch a 
new potential block buster product and it would introduce the product in only a few 
stores. We would keep vendor B’s calculative commitment as null in both the cases to 
serve as control group. 
 
Manipulating personal commitment (Commitment to salesperson) 
We manipulate the loyalty commitment of the retail buyer towards the salesperson by 
using the manipulations used by Murry and Heide (1998). The high personal commitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low Power Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High Power Condition 
Retailer C 
Total Sales: $20 b 
Vendor B 
Total sales: $20 b 
Vendor A 
Total sales: $80 b  
Vendor B 
Total sales: $20 b 
Vendor A 
Total sales: $5 b  
Sales: $1 billion 
Sales: $1 billion 
Sales: $1 billion 
Sales: $1 billion 
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factor used was: “The salesperson is a personal friend from your college days and had 
gone out of the way to help you even when he was not working with the target vendor” 
while the low factor was: “The salesperson is completely new to target vendor”. Since 
vendor B would act like the control group, Vendor B would always have “The 
salesperson is completely new” as its manipulation. 
Manipulating Organizational Commitment 
We manipulate the organizational loyalty commitment of the retail buyer by using one 
item mentioned by Tellefsen and Thomas (2005). The high organizational commitment 
factor was manipulated by the following statement: “Your company has been involved in 
joint research and development with vendor A for the last 10 years and you personally 
spearheaded this initiative with vendor A. You also have tremendous personal respect for 
vendor A’s professionalism in business.”  
 
The low manipulation was “You have started on the relationship with vendor A only in 
the last 10 years”. As in the manipulation of personal commitment, vendor B would 
always have “You have started on the relationship with vendor B only in the last 10 
years”.  All the manipulations used in the experiment are provided in Table 2 - 5. An 
example of the scenarios used is provided in appendix A. 
 82 
Table 2: Manipulations used in the scenarios: power asymmetry 
 Power Asymmetry 
 High Low 
Target Vendor Acme Bubble Company is a very big 
and powerful $80 billion dollar firm 
that you have been doing business 
with for the last 15 years which 
controls almost 80% of the entire 
production of bubble wraps in the 
world. Acme is considered a very 
powerful company since Acme 
literally sets the price for the entire 
global market for bubble wraps and 
hence Acme commands tremendous 
respect in the business world. Acme 
is also four times larger than your 
company in terms of revenue. 
 
Acme Bubble Company is a small $5 
billion dollar firm that you have been 
doing business with for the last 15 
years which controls only 5% of the 
entire production of bubble wraps in 
the world. 
 
Alternate vendor Simons Bubble Co, is a much smaller 
$20 billion firm that has also been in 
the bubble wrap business for a long 
time. 
 
Simons Bubble Co, is a much smaller 
$20 billion  firm that has also been in 
the bubble wrap business for a long 
time. 
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Table 3: Manipulations used in the scenarios – calculative commitment 
 Calculative Commitment 
 High Low 
Target Vendor Acme Bubble Company Likely to 
launch a new improved product in 
the next few months and we might 
get exclusive distribution (our market 
research says that this will be a high 
margin blockbuster) 
Plus 
Acme in the past has provided 
year- end bonus trade 
promotions for meeting yearly 
targets 
 
-- Null-- 
Alternate vendor -- Null -- 
 
-- Null -- 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Manipulations used in the scenarios – loyalty commitment to organization 
 Loyalty Commitment to Organization 
 High Low 
Target Vendor Your company has been involved in 
joint research and development with 
Acme for the last 10 years and you 
personally spearheaded this initiative 
with Acme. You also have 
tremendous personal respect for 
Acme’s professionalism in business. 
 
-- Null -- 
 
Alternate vendor -- Null -- 
 
-- Null -- 
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Table 5: Manipulations used in the scenarios – loyalty Commitment to Vendor 
Salesperson 
 Loyalty Commitment to Vendor Salesperson 
 High Low 
Target Vendor You also really like Bob Jones who 
is the sales person from Acme and is 
a personal friend from your college 
days. You have been dealing with 
him even when he was not with 
Acme. Bob is also a great 
salesperson and in the past has gone 
out of his way to do favors for you. 
 
Plus 
 
Your friend Bob made a personal 
request that he needs this order. 
 
Bob Jones is the new sales person 
from Acme and you find him to be a 
very competent and honest man. 
 
Alternate vendor The salesperson for Simons Bubble 
Co is Tom White who was recently 
appointed and you have found him to 
be a decent and honest man. 
 
The salesperson for Simons Bubble Co 
is Tom White who was recently 
appointed and you have found him to 
be a decent and honest man. 
 
 
Research Procedure 
 
The first step in our research was to ensure that the experiment would allow us to do the 
manipulations we wanted. For this we conducted two pretests. Both the pretests were 
conducted with working MBA students, as we felt that working MBA students could act 
as close proxies to our target respondent profile which was purchasing managers. 
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Pretest 1 
In our first pretest we choose two cells (cell 1 and cell 16) that contained all the 
manipulations. In cell 1, all the manipulations of power, calculative commitment, loyalty 
commitment to organization and loyalty commitment to sales person was HIGH. In cell 
16 the manipulations of the above mentioned variables was low or neutral. The use of 
these two cells allowed us to test in a single setting whether the all the manipulations 
were working or not. 26 MBA students in a class room setting were recruited. All the 
respondents were explained that we were conducting a study of purchasing managers and 
that we wanted them to imagine themselves in the shoes of a purchasing manager and 
answer all the questions the way in which they think a real purchasing manager would 
behave.  No other explanations were offered to the respondents. After all the respondents 
had completed answering the instrument, the respondents were debriefed and the purpose 
of the study was explained.  
 
The data from the pretest was analyzed using SPSS 14. Since the focus of the pretest was 
only to test whether the manipulations worked, we did not check the effect of the 
impendent variables on the dependent variable. The first pretest showed that the power 
manipulation was working properly. Respondents could see that vendor A was more 
powerful than Vendor B, however we felt that the power asymmetry differences could be 
increased even more. Respondents could not differentiate between the manipulations of 
calculative commitment (F=3.854; sig=0.061).  Similarly the manipulations of loyalty 
commitment to organization were barely significant at the 0.5 alpha levels (F=4.20; 
sig=0.052). The manipulations of loyalty commitment to vendor salesperson worked.  
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To address the issue we rewrote the scenarios to make the manipulations stronger. To 
increase the power difference, we added the following line to power manipulation. 
“Acme is considered a very powerful company and controls 80% of the entire world 
market. They literally set the price for bubble wraps”. To increase organization 
commitment the following lines were added, “You have tremendous respect for Acme 
and you have personally spearheaded a project with acme”. Finally to increase calculative 
commitment, we added the following line “Acme might offer a year end bonus” The 
changes made can be seen in table 6. 
Table 6: Changes made in Manipulations after First Pretest 
Independent 
Variable  
Original Manipulation After Pretest 
Power Assymetry Acme Bubble Company is a very big 
and powerful $80 billion dollar firm 
that you have been doing business with 
for the last 15 years which controls 
almost 80% of the entire production of 
bubble wraps in the world. 
Acme Bubble Company is a very big 
and powerful $80 billion dollar firm 
that you have been doing business with 
for the last 15 years which controls 
almost 80% of the entire production of 
bubble wraps in the world.  
 
Acme is considered a very powerful 
company since Acme literally sets the 
price for the entire global market for 
bubble wraps and hence Acme 
commands tremendous respect in the 
business world. Acme is also four 
times larger than your company in 
terms of revenue. 
 
Calculative 
Commitment 
Likely to launch a new improved 
product in the next few months and we 
might get exclusive distribution (our 
market research says that this will be a 
high margin blockbuster) 
Acme Bubble Company Likely to 
launch a new improved product in the 
next few months and we might get 
exclusive distribution (our market 
research says that this will be a high 
 87 
margin blockbuster) 
Plus 
Acme in the past has provided 
year- end bonus trade 
promotions for meeting yearly 
targets  
Organizational 
Commitment 
Your company has also been involved 
in joint research and development with 
Acme for last 10 years and you 
personally spearheaded this initiative 
with Acme.  
 
Your company has been involved in 
joint research and development with 
Acme for the last 10 years and you 
personally spearheaded this initiative 
with Acme. You also have tremendous 
personal respect for Acme’s 
professionalism in business. 
 
Personal 
Commitment 
You also really like Bob Jones who is 
the sales person from Acme and is a 
personal friend from your college days. 
You have been dealing with him even 
when he was not with Acme. Bob is 
also a great salesperson and in the past 
has gone out of his way to do favors 
for you. 
 
Plus 
 
Your friend Bob made a personal 
request that he needs this order. 
 
You also really like Bob Jones who is 
the sales person from Acme and is a 
personal friend from your college days. 
You have been dealing with him even 
when he was not with Acme. Bob is 
also a great salesperson and in the past 
has gone out of his way to do favors 
for you. 
 
Plus 
 
Your friend Bob made a personal 
request that he needs this order. 
 
 
Pretest 2 
To test whether the modified manipulations worked, we did a second pretest. This time 
we conducted the test with another batch of thirty seven executive MBA students. The 
cells selected for testing were Cell 7 and Cell 12. These cells were selected because in 
these cells the manipulation of loyalty commitment to vendor salesperson was kept 
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constant. Like the first pretest, the respondents were asked to imagine themselves in the 
role of purchasing managers and make their decisions accordingly. The respondents were 
also offered a raffle for participating in the survey. The total raffle amount was kept to a 
minimum ($50). At the end of the survey a small debriefing was done.  
 
Like the first pretest we only used the data collected from the pretest for manipulation 
checks. This time all the manipulations checks came out significant and we have 
subsequently used the same manipulations in our final study. 
 
Main Study Survey Administration 
We decided to conduct the experiment electronically so as to enable purchasing managers 
from all over the country to participate and also enable automatic data entry. Another 
reason for deciding to use an electronic format was the expense of administering the 
instruments using a paper and pen format. While we had some concerns about the 
response rates obtained in online research, recent research suggests that there is not much 
difference between the response rates of online and offline surveys (Roster et al. 2007) 
therefore we decided to go ahead with this plan.  
 
Since we had sixteen cells in all, we created sixteen versions of the instrument using a 
professional survey creation tool on the internet. We used qualtrics.com as our survey 
software. However the existence of the sixteen instruments created a problem. We could 
mail only one link to our respondents. And we had to somehow allocate the respondents 
to one of 16 conditions. To solve the problem we created two websites both hosted on 
 89 
Georgia State University web servers. Hosting the initial web-pages on GSU web servers 
also allowed us to increase the legitimacy of the survey.  
 
The first website was a simple link (www.education.gsu.edu/sma) that only served as a 
redirecting website. The respondents were automatically transferred from the first 
website to the second website which was based on asp programming. This second 
website hosted the first page of the survey, included the instructions and had a link to the 
IRB consent form (Appendix B). The website also performed a sorting function. It 
automatically allocated the respondents to one of the 16 instruments which were hosted 
on qualtrics.com web-servers. The allocation was done on a round-robin basis. The first 
respondent was allocated to the first condition, the second to the second condition and so 
on. The pattern repeated itself after 16 respondents. Figure 3 gives the schematic diagram 
of the data collection method. This method allowed us to allocate the respondents quite 
evenly amongst all the cells. 
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Figure 3: Schematic Diagram of Survey Administration 
 
 
Data Collection 
 
To obtain maximum external validity for our research, we decided to exclusively target 
purchasing managers. Initially we wanted to target only purchasing managers who work 
in the retail industry to participate in our study. However we had to broaden our subject 
profile for two reasons. First, since the goal of this dissertation research was theory 
testing and the retail environment was only a context in which the theory was being 
tested we felt confident that purchasing managers in other sectors would also be able to 
identify themselves in such a scenario. The second reason for broadening the criteria was 
the non availability of a specific sampling frame constituting purchasing managers 
working in the retail industry.  
 
http://education.gsu.edu/sma 
ASP based Web-server 
Respondent # 1? Cell 1 
Respondent # 2? Cell 2 
Respondent # 3? Cell 3 
Respondent # n? Cell n 
(Repeat every 16 respondents)
Qualtrics.com 
Cell 1 
Qualtrics.com
Cell 2
Qualtrics.com
Cell 3 
Qualtrics.com 
Cell n 
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We decided to collect around 30 respondents per cell (Cohen 1992), so as to have enough 
sample size to enable the experiment to provide us with usable and stable statistical 
values. Because we had 16 cells, our targeted sample size therefore was 480 respondents.  
 
Obtaining 480 respondents, who were in the purchasing managers’ role to participate in 
our experiment, was a difficult task and we used the following strategies to generate 
enough respondents. The effectiveness of the strategies is also provided along with the 
strategies used. 
1) Three advertisements in the electronic newsletter; Just in e-time published by the 
Institute of Supply Chain Managers (ISM), which is the preeminent national 
association of supply chain managers. Effectiveness: Nil 
2) Running a keyword targeted web based ad campaign. We used Google adwords to 
buy up specific keywords related to purchasing managers. The ads were shown in 
continental USA, whenever someone searched using those keywords in Google’s 
search engine. The ads used are shown in Appendix C. Effectiveness: Nil 
3) Corporate support. We contacted a well known retail company to support this 
research. The purchasing head agreed to participate in the research by distributing 
the web link to the all the purchasing managers in the company. Effectiveness: 
Low 
4) Purchasing Managers Association support. Our initial goal was to convince ISM 
(Institute of Supply Chain Managers) to support the research. The first attempt to 
garner support failed. However we contacted all the affiliates at the state level. 
We were successful in convincing NAPM -Georgia, ISM – Seven counties, 
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NAPM – National Capital area, NAPM – Arizona, NAPM – Cincinnati and 
CAPM (Connecticut Association of Purchasing Management) to support the 
research. While NAPM-Georgia sent out emails to their members. The other 
associations only put the link to our survey along with a basic introduction on 
their main website. Effectiveness: Medium 
5) We also used panel data sourced from a leading online panel company 
(zoomerang.com). We requested a B2B panel consisting of only purchasing 
managers. The role of the online panel company was limited to sending an email 
to the purchasing managers in their panel with a link to our survey. The survey 
was still hosted on our webservers. The incentive offered was a chance to win 
$1000 USD. The incentive administration was handled by the panel management 
company. Effectiveness: High 
Using all these strategies we managed to generate overall 547 responses. We had to 
delete 62 responses because of duplicate/ incomplete responses. In the end we were left 
with 485 usable responses. We were thus able to get around 30 respondents per cells. The 
break up of the responses in terms of the cells is given in Table 7. The break up of the 
initial number of respondents in terms of the method used is given in Table 8. 
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Table 7: Break up of Respondents per Cell 
Scenario 
Power of 
Target 
vendor 
Calculative 
commitment
Loyalty 
commitment 
with sales 
person 
Loyalty 
commitment 
with firm 
# of 
respondents 
per cell 
1 High High High High 30 
2 High High High Neutral 32 
3 High High Neutral High 31 
4 High High Neutral Neutral 29 
5 High Neutral High High 31 
6 High Neutral High Neutral 29 
7 High Neutral Neutral High 30 
8 High Neutral Neutral Neutral 32 
9 Low High High High 27 
10 Low High High Neutral 32 
11 Low High Neutral High 30 
12 Low High Neutral Neutral 30 
13 Low Neutral High High 30 
14 Low Neutral High Neutral 31 
15 Low Neutral Neutral High 31 
16 Low Neutral Neutral Neutral 30 
 Total 485 
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Table 8: Number of respondents per method used 
Method Overall Response 
1) Advertisements in ISM Newsletter 2 
2) Keyword based ad campaign 0 
3) Corporate support 3 
4) Purchasing Management Association 
support 
159 
5) Panel Membership 383 
Total 547 
 
Overall we can see that only the last two methods were effective. The total response rate 
was calculated using the following method. A total of 4959 supply chain managers were 
in the sample frame that was used. This sample frame is calculated by using Table 9 
Table 9: Total sample frame 
Sample source Total Members 
1) NAPM-GA 780 
2) NAPM- Seven counties 139 
3) NAPM- Arizona 500 
4) NAPM - Cincinnati 540 
5) NAPM – National Capital Area 400 
6) CAPM (Connecticut Association of 
Purchasing Management) 
600 
5) Panel Membership 2000 
Total 4959 
 
The raw response rate for the study was slightly around 10%. However a better way of 
measuring the response rate would be to look at the number of people who initially went 
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to the main website and after reading the purpose of the study agreed to actually complete 
the study. This method is similar to the way how pen and paper survey research response 
rates are calculated in B2B research. In that method researchers initially pre-qualify 
respondents by calling a larger sample frame. People who agree to participate are then 
sent the instrument. Response rates are calculated as number of people who actually 
answer the survey with respect to the number of people who agreed to participate. 
 
Similarly in our research while we did approach 4959 potential purchasing managers, not 
all managers saw the invitation (most associations only posted the link on their website). 
Of the 4959 managers approached, 1112 mangers actually clicked on the link to the first 
page of the survey which explained the purpose of the study. Out of these 547 actually 
completed the instrument. And of these 547 only 485 responses were usable. Therefore 
our effective response rate according to this calculation is 43%.  
 
Data Characteristics 
In this section we explain the demographic characteristic of the data. We collected data 
only from people who were in purchasing. We had good representation from both men 
and women in the data. Out of 485 overall respondents we had 54.2% males. The break 
up of the gender classification is given in table 10. 
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Table 10: Gender classification of respondent sample 
Classification Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Male 263 54.2 54.8 
Females 217 44.7 44.7 
Missing 
Values 
5 1.0  
Total 485 100% 100% 
  
We also had a wide variety of experience represented in our sample. Respondents were 
asked to indicate the extent of their total work experience. They were asked to classify 
themselves in one of four groups. Overall it seems that most of our respondent sample 
had enough work experience to justify inclusion in our study. The work experience 
characteristics of the sample are provided in Table 11  
Table 11: Work experience of respondent sample 
Classification Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Less than 5 years 23 4.7 4.8 
5 to 10  years 50 10.3 10.4 
11 to 15 years 61 12.6 12.7 
More than 15 
years 
346 71.3 72.1 
Missing Values 5 1  
Total 485 100% 100% 
 
We also asked the respondents to identify the industry that they represent. As can be seen 
our respondents come from a wide variety of industries. The industry profile of the 
sample is provided in table 12.  
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Table 12: Industry classification of respondent sample 
Classification Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Retailing 51 10.5 10.6 
Wholesale/Distribution 42 8.7 8.8 
Utilities 13 2.7 2.7 
Government 43 8.9 9.0 
Health Services 36 7.4 7.5 
Engineering/Research 10 2.1 2.1 
Finance/ Banking / 
Insurance 
9 1.9 1.9 
Food Service 11 2.3 2.3 
Service 8 1.6 1.7 
Lodging 4 0.8 0.8 
Transportation 29 6.0 6.0 
Publishing 4 0.8 0.8 
Communication 24 4.9 5.0 
Construction 16 3.3 3.3 
Education 29 6.0 6.0 
Others 151 31.1 31.5 
Missing Values 5 1.0  
Total 485 100% 100% 
 
We also asked respondents to classify their job profiles. We used the most common 
designations used in the purchasing area. The job profiles covered in our data is given in 
Table 13.  
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Table 13: Job profile classification of respondent sample 
Classification Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Purchasing Manager 125 25.8 26.1 
Purchasing Agent 91 18.8 19.0 
Purchasing 39 8 8.1 
Purchasing Director 27 5.6 5.6 
VP of Purchasing 9 1.9 1.9 
Materials Manager 20 4.1 4.2 
Materials Director 7 1.4 1.5 
Buying Coordinator 11 2.3 2.3 
Purchasing Supervisor 17 3.5 3.5 
VP of Materials 1 0.2 0.2 
Assistant Purchasing 
Agent 
14 2.9 2.9 
Buyer 68 14.0 14.2 
Others 50 10.3 10.4 
Missing Values 6 1.2  
Total 485 100% 100% 
 
We also had responses from purchasing managers who work in both large and small 
companies. Table 14, gives the break up of the data in terms of the size of the company 
that the respondents work for.  
 99 
 
Table 14: Classification of respondent company size 
Classification Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Less than $50 million 187 38.5 39.3 
$50 to $499.99 Million 85 17.5 17.8 
$500 Million  to $4.99 
Billion 
79 16.2 16.6 
$5 to $19.99 Billion 54 11.1 11.3 
20 Billion Plus 70 14.4 14.7 
Missing Values 10 2  
Total 485 100% 100% 
 
Also 399 respondents out of the total 485 who completed the surveys voluntarily 
provided their email address to get access of the results. Overall by looking at all the 
demographic data we can be fairly confident that we have a balanced sample especially 
when we consider that this is a hard to reach segment. We therefore decided to go ahead 
with the analysis of the data. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter describes the data analysis used to test our hypothesis. This chapter contains 
two main sections. The first section describes the analysis of the manipulation checks. 
The second section describes the analysis of the main hypotheses.  
Manipulation Checks Analysis 
Before we started analyzing our data we did manipulation checks to ensure that our 
independent variables were behaving the way they were supposed to. No experimental 
study can work if the manipulation checks don’t work out. We did four basic 
manipulation checks to ensure the integrity of our analysis.  
 
Our first manipulated variable was calculative commitment. We had included two items 
in the instrument to check for the manipulation effect of calculative commitment. The 
means and the reliability of the items are given in table 15. 
  
Table 15: Scale items – reliability – calculative commitment 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Acme Bubble Co is more likely to 
financially benefit your company in 
the medium to long term. 4.52 1.515 482
Acme Bubble co is more likely to 
provide financial gains in the near 
future 
4.51 1.410 482
0.809 
 
 
Since the overall reliability (correlation in this case) of the scale was above 0.7 which is 
the minimum recommended acceptable scale reliability (Nunnally 1978) we added up the 
scale items to form a composite measure of calculative commitment. This composite 
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measure was used for the manipulation check of calculative commitment. We used a 
simple t test to test for mean differences. As can be seen in table 16, the manipulation 
checks indicate that the manipulations were significantly different from each other. 
Overall respondents did rate the high calculative commitment condition as higher than 
the low calculative commitment condition. 
Table 16: Manipulation check - calculative commitment 
  Conditions N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
T Value Sig 
Calculative 
commitment 
Total 
High Calculative 
Commitment 240 9.6833 2.65596 .17144 
  Low Calculative 
Commitment 242 8.3884 2.55357 .16415 
5.456 0.00 
 
 
The second manipulated variable was loyalty commitment towards the organization. We 
had put two manipulation check items to test that loyalty commitment towards the 
organization was being manipulated in the right manner. The reliability (correlation) of 
the composite scale formed by the two items was 0.733 (table 17). 
 
Table 17: Scale items – reliability – loyalty commitment to organization 
 Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Chronbach’s 
alpha 
The relationship with Acme is more 
established  and important than the 
relationship with Simmons 
 3.80 1.639 483 
You are more likely to have a soft 
corner for Acme as compared to 
Simmons 4.13 1.686 483 
0.733 
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Like the earlier manipulation, we used a simple t-test to check for mean differences. As 
seen in table 18, we can clearly see that the manipulation worked. Respondents in high 
affect for the organization manipulation condition did feel differently from respondents in 
the low manipulation setting and the effect was significant. 
Table 18: Manipulation check- loyalty commitment to organization 
  Conditions N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
T Value Sig 
Loyalty to 
organization 
Total 
High Affect for 
Organization 240 8.5583 2.85726 .18444
  Low Affect for 
Organization 243 7.3128 2.92342 .18754
4.735 0.00 
 
 
The next manipulated independent variable that was tested was loyalty commitment to 
the vendor salesperson. This variable was tested using a non parametric measure, because 
of the way the manipulation was done. We manipulated the loyalty towards the 
salesperson in the scenario by showing that the retailer (the respondent in this case) has a 
friendship towards the salesperson of the target vendor. In our case the sales person of the 
target vendor was called Bob Jones. In the low Loyalty towards the salesperson condition, 
the respondent was supposed to identify both the target vendor’s sales person, “Bob 
jones” and the other vendor’s sales person “Tom white” as equal to each other. Therefore 
the manipulation would be considered workable if in the High “loyalty commitment to 
the salesperson” condition a majority of the respondents choose “Bob Jones” as “The  
vendor salesperson they are more likely to feel a strong liking for”. Similarly in the low 
“Loyalty commitment to the salesperson” condition, the majority of the respondents 
should chose “Both are same” as the preferred value. 
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Since the values were not collected as continuous variables and are non-parametric in 
nature we use chi-square tests for doing the manipulation tests. Table 19 below gives the 
values for the Chi-square tests. 
Table 19: Manipulation check: calculative commitment towards vendor salesperson 
Conditions  Choice 
Observed 
N 
Expected 
N Residual 
Chi-square Df sig 
Bob Jones 29 80.3 -51.3
Tom White 13 80.3 -67.3
Both are same 199 80.3 118.7
No affect for 
Salesperson 
  
  
  Total 241   
264.531 2 0.000
Bob Jones 136 80.7 55.3
Tom White 14 80.7 -66.7
Both are same 92 80.7 11.3
High affect 
for 
Salesperson 
  
  
  
Total 
242   
94.645 2 0.000
 
It is very clear from the above table that when we manipulated loyalty towards the target 
vendor’s salesperson (Bob Jones) it worked the way it was supposed to work. Also in the 
null condition majority of the people considered their affect for both the salespersons to 
be same. 
 
The final variable that was manipulated was power difference between the target vendor 
and the retailer. In the manipulation we wanted three effects to take place. 
a) In the High Power condition – The target vendor must be considered more 
powerful than the retailer when compared to the low power condition. 
b) In The High Power condition- The target vendor must also be considered more 
powerful than the second alternate vendor.  
c) In all conditions the second vendor must be considered equally powerful to the 
retailer. 
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To fulfill all these conditions we had devised three tests to ensure that the power 
manipulation was working exactly as we planned. 
 
The first manipulation check was done by asking the following question to all the 
respondents “Acme Bubble Co (target vendor) can be considered more powerful than 
your company”. Therefore if our manipulation works, respondents should agree to this 
statement in the high power situation compared to the low power situation. Table 20 
gives the mean values and the t-test for both the situations. 
 
Table 20: Manipulation check: power of target vendor vis-à-vis the retailer 
  Choices Power N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
T Value Sig 
Acme Bubble 
Co can be 
considered 
more powerful 
than your 
company 
Vendor More 
Powerful 
242 4.70 1.615 .104
  Vendor Less 
Powerful 241 2.54 1.369 .088
15.904 0.00
 
As can be seen in the above table, when we manipulate the target vendor to be more 
powerful the mean is 4.70 while in the situation when the vendor is considered less 
powerful the mean in only 2.54. Since the scale is anchored on strongly agree (7)/ 
strongly disagree (1). It means that when we manipulated the target vendor to be more 
powerful, the respondents agreed with the statement and when we manipulated the target 
vendor to be less powerful, the respondents disagreed with the given statement. 
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The second manipulation check was done by asking the following question “Acme 
Bubble Co (target vendor) can be considered more powerful than Simons Bubble Co 
(alternate vendor).” This question was asked as according to our manipulation, not only 
should the target vendor be considered more powerful than the retailer in the high power 
manipulation but also should be considered more powerful than the alternate vendor and 
vice-versa. Therefore the manipulation has worked if in the high power manipulation 
respondents agree to the statement and in the low power statement they disagree with the 
statement and this difference is significant. Table 21 gives the mean values and the t-test 
to check the validity of the manipulation. 
 
Table 21: Manipulation check: power of target vendor vis-à-vis the alternate vendor 
   Power N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
T Value Sig 
Acme Bubble Co 
can be considered 
more powerful than 
Simons Paper Co. 
Vendor 
More 
Powerful 242 5.64 1.559 .100
  Vendor 
Less 
Powerful 
241 2.66 1.470 .095
21.616 0.000
 
 
As clearly seen in the above table under high power manipulation, the target vendor is 
considered more powerful than the alternate vendor (mean 5.64) and in the low power 
situation the target vendor is considered less powerful than the alternate vendor. 
 
The third manipulation check on power was done by utilizing Emerson’s (1962) power = 
dependence formulation. According to Emerson, power asymmetry exists when one party 
is more dependent on the other party. To ensure that we were following Emerson’s 
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guidelines with respect to how power was conceptualized and to make sure that our third 
condition “The second vendor is considered equally powerful to the retailer” we asked 
three manipulation check questions to all the respondents. Since the questions were asked 
in an agree/disagree format we use chi-square analysis to test that the manipulation is 
working the way it is supposed to be.  
 
The first two manipulation checks are given in Table 22 and Table 23 
Table 22: Manipulation check: power=dependence for target vendor -1 
 
Power   
Observed 
N 
Expected 
N Residual
Chi-
square 
Df Sig 
Agree 158 121.5 36.5Vendor 
More 
Powerful 
  
Disagree 
85 121.5 -36.5
  Total 243   
21.930 1 0.00
Agree 29 120.5 -91.5Vendor 
Less 
Powerful 
  
 
Disagree 212 120.5 91.5
Your 
Company is 
more 
dependent on 
Acme than 
Acme is 
dependent on 
your company 
 
  Total 241   
138.959 1 0.00
 
 
Table 23: Manipulation check: power=dependence for target vendor -2 
 
Power   
Observed 
N 
Expected 
N Residual
Chi-
square 
Df Sig 
Vendor 
More 
Powerful 
 
Agree 46 121.5 -75.5
  Disagree 197 121.5 75.5
93.831 1 0.00
  Total 243    
Vendor 
Less 
Powerful 
 
Agree 198 120.5 77.5
Acme is more 
dependent on 
your 
Company 
than your 
company is 
dependent on 
Acme 
   Disagree 43 120.5 -77.5
99.689 1 0.00
   Total 241    
 
As can be clearly seen in table 22, we asked the respondents if they thought their 
company was more dependent on the target vendor than vice versa. If our manipulation 
works then respondents should agree to the statement in the high power situation and 
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disagree with the same statement in the low power situation. Table 22 suggests that 
respondents did exactly as we anticipated they would do. 
 
We also asked the same question in a reverse manner as seen in table 23 to check that the 
response to the first manipulation check was a true understanding of the situation. In this 
question we asked if the respondents thought that the target vendor was more dependent 
on their company than vice versa. The manipulation now works if the respondents 
disagree with the statement in the high power manipulation and agree to the statement in 
the low power condition. As can be seen in table 23 we find full support for our 
manipulation here. 
 
Our final manipulation check concerned how the alternate vendor is perceived by the 
respondents. The alternate vendor was named Simmons Bubble Company and our 
manipulation intended Simmons’ to be considered equally powerful to the retailer. And 
since power is defined as equal to dependence, we asked if the respondents considered 
Simmons to be equally dependent on the retailer as the retailer is dependent on Simmons. 
We expected that respondents would agree to the statement in both the High Power and 
Low power manipulation situation.  As can be seen in Table 24, we found support for our 
manipulation. 
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Table 24: Manipulation check: power=dependence for alternate vendor 
 
Power   
Observed 
N 
Expected 
N Residual
Chi-
square 
Df Sig 
Vendor 
More 
Powerful 
 
Agree 167 121.5 45.5
  Disagree 76 121.5 -45.5
  Total 243   
34.078 1 0.0
Vendor 
Less 
Powerful 
 
Agree 152 120.5 31.5
  Disagree 89 120.5 -31.5
Your 
company is 
equally 
dependent on 
Simmons as 
Simmons is 
dependent on 
your company 
 
  Total 241   
16.469 1 0.0
 
 
From the above discussion we can see that all our manipulations worked exactly as we 
intended them to. However before going on to hypothesis testing we wanted to do some 
more tests to ensure the validity of our results. 
 
Panel vs Non Panel Data 
As mentioned earlier we collected data from two basic sources. While we obtained some 
data from purchasing managers who were reached via their associations, a large chunk of 
the data was obtained from a panel. It is possible that that since the panel consists of 
people who have agreed to answer surveys in return for some personal gain there might 
exist some bias in terms of their responses. We wanted to make sure that the bias should 
not be affecting the results of this study. Since we had a reasonable number of responses 
from non panel members we were able to test if there was any difference in how the 
panel members respond versus the non-panel members. We therefore conducted a simple 
t-test of their responses to our dependent variable. The results are shown in table 25. 
 109 
 
Table 25: Panel vs. non-panel difference test 
 Dependent variable Panel N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
T-Value Sig 
Yes 349 59.9513 22.60367 1.20995  Behavioral commitment: Percent 
order to the target 
vendor 
  
 
No 132 59.4318 20.21155 1.75919
0.231 0.817
 
As can be seen from table 25 there is no significant difference between the means of the 
panel and the non panel members. Therefore we can be confident of merging the 
responses of the both these groups when analyzing our data.  
Non Response bias 
Good research demands that we test for non- response bias in our sample. The accepted 
method for testing for non-response bias is by dividing the data into early and late 
responses and looking at the mean differences between the two groups (Armstrong and 
Overton 1977). The results of the test are provided in table 26 
Table 26: Early vs late respondents difference test 
 Dependent Variable Phase N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
T-Value Sig 
Early 
Respondents 
 
283 60.3110 21.76589 1.29385
Behavioral 
commitment: Percent 
order to the target 
vendor 
  
Late 
respondents 198 59.0909 22.25491 1.58159
0.599 0.549
 
As we can see from table 26 the two groups are not very different from each other in 
terms of their response to our final dependent variable. 
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Scenario Realism 
We conducted another test to look at the scenario realism. Since the study was aimed at 
understanding the behaviors of purchasing managers and we had asked them to imagine 
themselves in a scenario devised by us. We wanted to know how likely it was that such a 
scenario happened in real life business situations. We had an item in the instrument 
which asked the following question “In your opinion how often does the scenario 
described above occurs in practice (meaning two vendors who offer the same trade deal 
and you are forced to make a choice)”. The choices were anchored on very often (7) to 
very rarely(1). 
 
Table 27 gives the descriptive scores on this item by all the respondents in the sample.  
 
Table 27: Scenario realism score 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
In your opinion how 
often does the scenario 
described above occurs 
in practice  (meaning two  
vendors who offer the 
same trade deal and you 
are forced to make a 
choice) 
479 1 7 4.35 1.729 
      
 
From the table we can see that the mean score (4.35) is more than 3.5 which is the mid 
point value. Therefore the scenario is not totally unknown to the respondent population. 
However to ensure greater external validity we ran the same analysis for all respondents 
who work in the retail sector, since the scenario was based in the retail sector. The results 
of the analysis can be seen in table 28. We get similar mean scores as compared to the 
overall sample. Therefore we can be reasonably sure about the validity of our 
experimental scenario as being relevant to practicing managers. 
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Table 28: Scenario realism score - retail industry purchase manager 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
In your opinion how 
often does the scenario 
described above occurs 
in practice  (meaning two  
vendors who offer the 
same trade deal and you 
are forced to make a 
choice) 
51 1 7 4.20 1.662 
  
a  Please check the industry which best describes the company you work in = Retailing 
 
 
Since all of the checks were successful, we feel confident about going for hypothesis 
testing. In the next section we discuss the methods used for testing our hypotheses and 
the results of our study. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
We used dummy coded regression to test all our hypotheses. According to (Pedhazur 
1997) dummy coded multiple regression is considered a more comprehensive and general 
approach to data analysis because all variables are viewed from the same frame of 
reference. It is even more appropriate when the attempt is to explain or predict a 
dependent variable (Pedhazur 1997). Further more multiple regressions provide us with 
path coefficients that tell us about the strength of the antecedent variables. Pedhazur 
(1997) also suggest using multiple regression over anova when cell frequencies in a 
factorial design are unequal and disproportionate. Although some researchers disagree 
and claim that ANOVA is robust to violations of unequal cell size (Lindman 1974) 
 
In our study the goal was to look at the how the antecedent variables were influencing the 
dependent variable. Furthermore since some of our hypotheses hypothesized about the 
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strength of antecedent variables as compared to others in different situations, we 
considered multiple regression as the appropriate technique to use.  
 
Main and initial interaction effects 
The first goal was to test the main effects of our independent variables. Our main and 
only dependent variable was behavioral commitment of the retailer towards the target 
vendor and it was operationalized as the percent of the order provided to the target 
vendor. Hypothesis 1 through 4 and 6 were tested by regressing behavioral commitment 
on power asymmetry, calculative commitment, loyalty commitment to salesperson and 
loyalty commitment to firm. Hypotheses 5a and 5b were tested by including an 
interaction term in the equation. We included an interaction term so that we could test for 
the moderation effect (Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie 1981) of calculative commitment 
on loyalty to the organization and loyalty to the salesperson. The following overall model 
was tested: 
Y = a1 +b*x1 + c*x2 + d*x3 +e*x4 + f*(x2*x3) + g *(x2*x4) + error ---- (i) 
Where: 
Y = Retailer’s behavioral commitment to the target vendors trade promotion 
x1= Power asymmetry between the retailer and the target vendor 
x2= Retailer’s calculative commitment towards the target vendor 
x3= Retailer’s personal commitment to the target vendors salesperson 
x4 = Retailer’s organizational commitment to the target vendor 
Table 29 provides the results of the main regression equation 
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Table 29: Main effects regression equation - I 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model 
Dependent Var:  
Behavioral 
Commitment  
(% order to Target 
vendor) B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 52.048 2.460  21.155 .000
Power (x1) -9.046 1.869 -.206 -4.839 .000
Cal_Commit (x2) 15.680 3.240 .357 4.839 .000
Loy_Salesp (x3) 5.500 2.641 .125 2.083 .038
Loy_Org (x4) 7.283 2.641 .166 2.758 .006
Cal_Commit 
x_Loy_sales  -3.322 3.740 -.066 -.888 .375
1 
Cal_Commit 
x_Loy_org -4.347 3.740 -.085 -1.162 .246
 R = 0.373 R2 =0.139  
 
 
From table 29 we can see that many of the hypotheses were supported.  The main model 
explained 13.9% (R2) of the overall variance in the dependent variable. Hypothesis H1 
which concerned the effect of calculative commitment of the retailer on the behavioral 
commitment shown by the same retailer would be supported if c is positive and 
significant. As can be seen from table 29, calculative commitment does have a positive 
and significant impact. (B=15.680; sig 0.00) on behavioral commitment. We therefore 
find support for hypothesis H1. 
 
In this equation we did not test the combined effect of loyalty commitment on behavioral 
commitment. Instead this equation tests for the separate effects of the two forms of 
loyalty commitment. Hypothesis H3 and H4 would be confirmed if loyalty commitment 
towards the vendor salesperson (d) and loyalty commitment towards the organization (e) 
have a positive and significant effect of behavioral commitment. As can be seen from 
table 29, Loyalty to vendor salesperson has a positive and significant effect (B=5.5; 
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sig=0.038) therefore we find support for hypothesis H3. Loyalty to vendor organization 
also has a positive and significant effect (B=7.283; sig=0.006). Thus we find support for 
H4 also. 
  
Hypotheses H5a and H5b were about testing the interaction effect of loyalty commitment 
to vendor salesperson and loyalty commitment to vendor organization with calculative 
commitment. According to the two hypotheses the effect of calculative commitment on 
behavioral commitment decreases in the presence of the two variables. Therefore if f and 
g (equation - i) have negative signs and are significant we would have support for 
hypothesis H5a and H5b respectively.  
 
From the table we see that both these hypotheses are not supported. For H5a (B=-3.322; 
sig= 0.375), increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the target vendors 
salesperson does decrease the positive effect that calculative commitment has on 
behavioral commitment, since the beta value is definitely negative, however the effect is 
not strong enough and it is not significant. 
 
Similarly for H5b (B= - 4.347; Sig= 0.246), increased organization commitment of the 
retailer towards the target vendor does decrease the positive effect that calculative 
commitment has on behavioral commitment since the beta value is again negative, 
however the effect is not strong enough and therefore not significant. 
 
Hypothesis H6 was formulated to explain the effect of power asymmetry on behavioral 
commitment. According to Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp’s (1998) relative power theory, 
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the weaker and more dependent parties always agree with the stronger party to prevent 
punitive action. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that when vendors are more powerful, 
the retailers increase the behavioral commitment to that vendor’s trade promotion. 
However our study found very contrary evidence. From Table 29 we can clearly see that 
while power does have a significant impact on behavioral commitment (B= -9.046; 
Sig=0.00) the direction of the effect is opposite to the one we had hypothesized. 
Therefore we fail to find support for Hypothesis H6. 
 
Even though our hypothesis failed, we know that this directional effect was actually 
hypothesized by Emerson (1962) who theorized that because power asymmetry is 
inherently unstable, the weaker parties always undertakes balancing operations for 
reducing the power advantage. A similar effect was also hypothesized by bilateral 
deterrence theory (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) whereby the weaker party tries 
to balance power asymmetry. Our study actually provides empirical proof for both the 
theories. 
 
Hypothesis H2 was formulated to test the effect of loyalty commitment of the retailer on 
the behavioral commitment shown by the same retailer. This loyalty commitment 
variable was a comprehensive construct not divided into its two facets of loyalty to the 
organization and loyalty to the salesperson. To test hypothesis H2 we had to do some data 
manipulation.  
 
 116 
We start by recoding x3 and x4 and creating another variable m1. Where m1 = 1 when 
both x3 and x4 = 1and m1=0 when both x3 and x4 =0. What this recoding means is that 
the retailer has high overall loyalty commitment to the target vendor when both 
organizational commitment and loyalty commitment to salesperson are high and that 
there is no loyalty commitment only when personal commitment to salesperson and 
organizational commitment are both absent. We would ignore situations where only one 
of the two types of loyalty commitment is high. We will thus consider only the extreme 
conditions to test the hypothesis. The regression equation that would be estimated is: 
 
Y= a2 + b1* x1 + c1 * x2 + d1* m1 + error ------ (ii) 
Where: 
x1 = Power asymmetry between the retailer and the target vendor 
x2= Retailer’s calculative commitment towards the target vendor 
m1= Retailer’s Loyalty commitment to the target vendor 
 
The results of the regression are presented in table 30. 
Table 30: Main effects regression equation - II 
Model 
Dependent Var:  
Behavioral 
Commitment  
(% order to Target 
vendor) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B 
Std. 
Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 56.762 2.635  21.539 .000 
  Power (x1) -12.219 2.658 -.277 -4.597 .000 
  Cal_Commit (x2) 8.892 2.658 .201 3.346 .001 
  Loyalty_Commit 
(m1) 9.052 2.658 .205 3.406 .001 
 R =0.396 R2=0.157  
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As can be seen in table 30, loyalty commitment has a significant and positive effect 
(B=9.052; Sig=0.00) on behavioral commitment. We therefore find support for H2. 
 
Hypothesis H7 and H8 (where the aim is to test the moderating effect of power 
asymmetry on behavioral commitment), were tested by dividing the data into two 
subgroups, one where the vendor is more powerful and another where the retailer is more 
powerful. Two regressions were carried out with the dependent variable as behavioral 
commitment and the independent variables being calculative commitment and overall 
loyalty commitment. The different beta weights obtained enable us to test both the 
hypotheses. The equations in standardized form would be 
 
Y1 = β1* x2 + β2 * m1 + error ---- (iii) 
Y2 = β3* x2 + β4 * m1 + error ---- (iv) 
 
Where 
x2= Retailer’s calculative commitment towards the target vendor 
m1= Retailer’s overall loyalty commitment to the target vendor 
and  
Equation (iii) is estimated for the group where the target vendor is less powerful than the 
retailer and  
Equation (iv) is for the group where the target vendor is more powerful than the retailer.  
 
The table 31 and table 32 provide the results of the two regressions. 
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Table 31: Moderating effects regression: vendor less powerful 
Model 
Dependent Var:  
Behavioral 
Commitment  
(% order to Target 
vendor) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B 
Std. 
Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 57.930 3.175  18.245 .000 
  Cal_Commit 7.307 3.699 .178 1.976 .051 
  Over_loyalty 8.241 3.699 .201 2.228 .028 
 R=0.265 R2= 0.07  
b  Power = Vendor Less Powerful 
 
Table 32: Moderating effects regression: vendor more powerful 
Model 
Dependent Var:  
Behavioral 
Commitment  
(% order to 
Target vendor) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B 
Std. 
Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 43.438 3.289  13.206 .000 
  Cal_Commit 10.405 3.841 .237 2.709 .008 
  Over_loyalty 9.777 3.840 .222 2.546 .012 
 R= 0.327 R2= 0.107  
b  Power = Vendor More Powerful 
 
Researchers (Burns and Bush 2006; Green, Tull, and Albaum 1988) suggest that when 
we want to make a statement about which independent variable has a bigger impact on 
the dependent variable, we should compare the beta weights (β) rather than the 
unstandardized coefficients. β-coefficients have the advantage of being directly 
comparable in relative importance of their effects on Y (Green, Tull, and Albaum 1988). 
These are regression coefficients that we get if we were to convert all independent and 
dependent variables to z-scores before doing the regression. It implies the effect that one 
standard deviation increase in the independent variable has on the standard deviation in 
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the predicted variable, while keeping all other variables constant in the regression model 
(Chen et al. 2006).  
 
Looking at table 31, we see that β2  > β1 and while the standardized beta weight β2 is 
significant at apha=0.05 levels; β1 is significant at alpha = 0.1 level (β2=0.201; sig = 
0.028 and β1=0.178; sig=0.051). Therefore when the vendor is less powerful than the 
retailer, it seems that the retailer’s overall loyalty commitment is a stronger predictor of 
behavioral commitment than the retailer’s calculative commitment which agrees with our 
hypothesis (H7). 
 
Similarly for H8 (table 32) we see that β3 > β4 and all the standardized beta weights are 
significant (β3=0.237; sig=0.008 and β4=0.222; sig=0.012).  Therefore again as before it 
seems that when the vendor is more powerful than the retailer, the retailers calculative 
commitment is a stronger predictor of behavioral commitment than the retailers overall 
loyalty commitment, giving support to H8. 
Table 33: Effects of different forms on commitment on behavioral commitment 
Dep: Behavioral 
Commitment 
High Power 
Asymmetry (β) 
Low Power 
Asymmetry (β) 
Calculative 
Commitment 0.237 0.178 
Loyalty 
commitment 0.222 0.201 
 
We find that under different power asymmetry conditions the effects of calculative 
commitment and loyalty commitment on behavioral commitment are different (table 33) 
and flip in terms of their strength. This is exactly as hypothesized by using the HSM 
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model and allows us to claim that under low power situations loyalty commitment is a 
stronger predictor than calculative commitment and under high power situation, 
calculative commitment is a stronger predictor than loyalty commitment.  
 
The complete summary of the hypotheses and the results are provided in figure 4 and  
table 34 . 
 
Figure 4: Final Model with Results: Retailer Commitment Model 
 
Significant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loyalty commitment 
Retailers Calculative 
Commitment with Vendor 
Behavioral Commitment 
of Retailer towards 
Vendor’s trade promotion Retailers Affective 
Commitment with Vendor 
Salesperson 
Retailers Affective 
Commitment with Vendor 
Organization 
Power Asymmetry between 
Retailer and Vendor 
Not Significant 
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Table 34: Hypotheses and results summary 
Hypothesis Result 
H1: Increased calculative commitment of the retailer with the 
target vendor would increase the overall behavioral commitment 
that the retailer demonstrates towards the target vendor’s trade 
promotions. 
Supported 
H2: Increased loyalty commitment of the retailer with the target 
vendor would increase the overall behavioral commitment that 
the retailer demonstrates towards the target vendor’s trade 
promotions. 
Supported 
H3: Increased organizational commitment of the retailer towards 
the target vendor would increase the overall behavioral 
commitment that the retailer demonstrates towards the target 
vendor’s trade promotion. 
Supported 
H4: Increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the 
target vendor’s salesperson would increase the overall 
behavioral commitment that the retailer demonstrates towards 
the target vendor’s trade promotions. 
Supported 
H5a: Increased organizational commitment of the retailer 
towards the target vendor would decrease the positive effect that 
calculative commitment has on the behavioral commitment of 
the retailer towards the target vendor’s trade promotions 
Partially Supported 
Direction as 
hypothesized, β Not 
significant 
H5b: Increased personal commitment of the retailer towards the 
target vendor’s salesperson would decrease the positive effect 
that calculative commitment has on the behavioral commitment 
of the retailer towards the target vendor’s trade promotions. 
Partially Supported 
Direction as 
hypothesized, β Not 
significant 
H6: When the target vendor is more powerful than the retailer, 
the retailer would increase its behavioral commitment to the 
target vendor’s trade promotions. 
 
Not Supported. 
Significant effect but 
in opposite direction  
H7: When the vendor is less powerful than the retailer then the 
retailer’s loyalty commitment would be a stronger predictor of 
behavioral commitment towards the target vendor’s trade 
promotions than the retailer’s calculative commitment. 
Supported  
 
H8: When the vendor is more powerful than the retailer then the 
retailer’s calculative commitment would be a stronger predictor 
of behavioral commitment towards the target vendor’s trade 
promotions than the retailer’s loyalty commitment. 
Supported  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This chapter consists of four main parts. In the first part we will discuss the results 
obtained from the study. We will also discuss the implications of the results and compare 
it with previous research. In the second part we will discuss the contributions of this 
study in terms of theory, methodology and practice. The third part of this chapter would 
discuss in brief the future directions for extending this research and finally we will 
discuss the weakness of this study and possible ways in which they could be rectified/ 
improved upon in future studies. 
 
Discussion of Results 
As discussed in the previous chapter we found full or partial support for most of our 
hypotheses. However we did get some surprises which were contrary to our hypotheses. 
The interesting part was that these non supported results actually gave support to 
alternate theories. In this section we will first discuss the main effects and then the results 
for the interaction effects. And finally we will discuss how this study compares with 
previous studies and how it adds to our understanding of the phenomenon under study. 
 
Main Effect – Role of the Different forms of Commitments 
In this research we tested the main effects of two different kinds of commitment on 
behavioral commitment. In the case of calculative commitment we found support for the 
view that calculative commitment, especially instrumental or forward looking calculative 
commitment has a positive impact on behavioral commitment. We therefore could clarify 
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and add insight to the controversy whether calculative commitment has a positive or 
negative impact on behavior (Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern 1994). Since in this research we 
were able to keep negative cognitive commitment or locked-in continuance commitment  
(Sharma, Young, and Wilkinson 2006; Stebbins 1970) as constant through the use of 
experimental techniques, we could tease out the effect of this variable. It is pertinent to 
note here that calculative commitment as defined in literature is so alike to the definition 
of dependence that the effects that are hypothesized are also similar to the ones for 
dependence balancing as theorized by (Emerson 1962). 
 
We also found support for the main effect that loyalty commitment has on behavioral 
commitment. This result was expected as most scholars do believe that loyalty has a very 
important effect on behavior (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) 
had claimed that affective commitment does have a  big impact on dealers willingness to 
invest in relationships. Our research gives credence to the findings of these scholars. 
 
Moderating Effect – Role of the Different forms of Commitments 
We had hypothesized that personal commitment and organizational commitment actually 
reduce the positive impact of calculative commitment. We did not find support for our 
hypothesis. Although we did see that the direction of the effect was as hypothesized, it 
was not a strong enough effect. In simple terms it means the different forms of loyalty 
commitment cannot substitute or replace the strong effect that calculative commitment 
has on decision making.  
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Moderating Effect – Role of Power asymmetry on different forms of 
commitment 
An interesting finding of this research is the role played by power asymmetry in 
determining the effect the different forms of commitment has on behavioral commitment. 
Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) had demonstrated that affective commitment has the 
strongest positive association with the beneficial consequences of commitment followed 
by moral commitment and only then by calculative commitment.  
 
We found that Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) may be right only when the vendor is 
considered less powerful. On the other hand when the vendor is more powerful, 
calculative commitment seemed to have a bigger impact. Therefore this study added to 
our understanding of how commitment works on relationships in different scenarios. 
Research Contributions 
 
Theoretical contributions 
This research makes four theoretical contributions to the marketing literature. First it 
explains organizational buyer behavior in a dynamic setting where vendors strive to 
match incentives. Previous literature on trade promotion selections (Murry and Heide 
1998) assumed that vendors don’t match incentives, therefore their results found that 
higher incentives lead to better acceptance. This paper did not make that assumption. It 
assumed that vendors would always match incentives knowing that retailers use that as 
the primary decision maker. This paper explored how decisions are made even after 
parity is reached in immediate economic benefits. 
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The second interesting contribution of our study is the differential impact of the two types 
of loyalty commitment in business relationships. While Kumar, Hibbard, and Stern (1994) 
had talked only about the composite effect of affective commitment on behavior, in this 
research we were able to dissect the effect into its two components. We were able to 
individually show the effects of loyalty commitment to the selling firm (also called 
organizational commitment) and loyalty commitment to the salesperson (also called 
personal commitment) on behavioral commitment. We can see from table 35 that 
organizational commitment has a bigger effect than personal commitment on behavior. It 
would seem that companies/vendors who want to increase behavior commitment to 
themselves would do better if they spend more time and effort developing organizational 
commitment rather than developing personal commitment to their salespersons. It is not 
to say that personal commitment is not important. However power differences, 
calculative commitment, and organizational commitment play a more important role. 
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Table 35: Main effects regression equation - comparing effects of different types of  
commitments 
Effect 
Ranking 
Dependent 
Var:  
Behavioral 
Commitment  
(% order to 
Target vendor) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
    B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 52.048 2.460   
 2 Power -9.046 1.869 -.206 
 1 Cal_Commit 15.680 3.240 .357 
 4 Loy_Salesp 5.500 2.641 .125 
 3 Loy_Org 7.283 2.641 .166 
  Cal_Commit 
x_Loy_sales -3.322 3.740 -.066 
  Cal_Commit 
x_Loy_org -4.347 3.740 -.085 
 R = 0.373 R2 =0.139  
 
It can be seen that calculative commitment plays the most important role, followed by 
power asymmetry, loyalty to organization and finally loyalty to vendor salesperson. This 
gradation of importance by itself is an important contribution to the marketing literature. 
 
The third contribution of this study is that it used two theories to explain the behavior of 
retailers under parity situations. While we used commitment theory to explain main 
effects, we used the Heuristic Systematic Model borrowed from the CB literature to 
explain the interaction effects. This research found support for the Heuristic –Systematic 
model (Chaiken 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993) a choice theory which was originally 
applied only in the consumer behavior area. We find that the HSM model does stand up 
to empirical examination and is able to explain the behavior of purchasing mangers in a 
B2B setting. This research study opens the path for the use of this interesting theory in 
more B2B research studies. 
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Finally this research clarifies contradictory hypothesis proposed by different theories 
thereby helping in theory building. This study clarifies the role that power asymmetry, 
calculative commitment and loyalty commitment play in decision making. It was able to 
find strong support for some theories while proving that other theories may be applicable 
only in certain circumstances. 
 
Methodological Contribution 
This research proposes a new way of testing power effects simultaneously, without 
confounding its effects with calculative commitment. The use of the experimental 
methodology allows us to make statements about causality much more strongly than by 
using any other method.  
Contributions to Practice 
This research also makes contributions to managerial practice. First, it provides an 
answer to executives that is not obvious. It explores and answers questions about how 
decisions are made when parity conditions occur.  
 
It also has a normative component in that it tells managers what to do in situations when 
competitors match their offers, instead of constantly trying to outmatch the competition 
by increasing incentives as that helps only the retailer. For example, it makes it clear that 
if the vendor is more powerful it may make sense for vendors to develop calculative 
commitment in the retailers rather than spending time and effort in developing 
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relationship between the vendor salesperson and the retail buyer. This can be done by 
offering more exclusive deals to the retailers, giving year end deals etc.  
 
It also shows that if the vendor is less powerful it may make more sense to develop 
loyalty commitment by doing more product development projects, including the retail 
buyer in product development etc. The goal is that the retail company should feel loyalty/ 
affect for the vendor organization. They should get pride in being associated with the 
vendor. This goes beyond the relationship based on personalities or only economic 
benefits. 
 
This research has a diagnostic element as it explains to managers why retailers choose to 
make behavioral commitments to their competitors and not them even when they match 
the competitor on all the economic criteria.  
 
Finally it has public policy implications. This research clarifies that power does not tip 
the scale against the weaker party. This research suggests that if everything else remains 
equal, a weaker party would actually be preferred over a stronger party. It also tells the 
weaker party what strategy is likely to work for them namely cultivating loyalty 
commitment in the vendor rather than calculative commitment.  
 
It clearly tells the smaller vendor that it is not likely to loose out always especially if they 
match the initial economic benefit. Under some circumstances and with certain strategies 
it can emerge a winner. 
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Future Directions 
This research being theoretical in nature, but set in a very practical business setting can 
be extended to understand many interesting business phenomenon. For example, the 
dissertation’s theoretical insights could be used to test the role of power and commitment 
in different setting where there is likelihood of parity situations occurring, like hiring and 
promoting employees, hiring new vendors, discontinuing old products etc. Also the 
theoretical insights can be used to clarify the conceptual confusion in the literature 
between power and calculative commitment.  
 
Future research could also use other methods such as survey research to examine the 
external validity and reliability of the experimental findings. Respondents could be asked 
to recount their actual behaviors when they have faced parity situations. Such a study 
would provide a good insight into how decisions are made in complex business situations. 
 
This research explored how and why retailers choose trade promotions in general. Future 
research could explore why certain types of trade promotions are chosen by retailers even 
though they only offer future gains which are uncertain (choosing long term promotions 
over short term promotions). 
 
Limitations 
This research has certain limitations which must be noted while interpreting the results. 
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First, this research used a scenario based experimental method which is a simplistic 
representation of the real world. Real world scenarios are much more complex and such 
simplistic models might not work in real life. However, a role playing scenario allowed 
us to improve the internal validity of the research model. The unfortunate side effect of 
high internal validity is that external validity is sacrificed. Therefore the generalizability 
of the findings are limited in nature. 
 
Second, the scenario used in the experiment was based in a retail scenario and retail 
industry constitutes only a small subset of the overall B2B universe. Therefore more 
research needs to be undertaken to increase the generalizability of the findings in other 
sectors.  
 
Third, the answers provided by the respondents are self reported scores on hypothetical 
scenarios. The scores are not reflective of how the same respondents might have behaved 
in actually scenarios that they might have encountered in their real lives. These answers 
reflected intentional behaviors and not actual behaviors. 
 
Finally, the research used a sample of respondents that were not truly a randomized 
sample. Part of the sample was from a panel while the other part was randomized. 
Although we tested for the equivalence of the two samples in strict terms we cannot 
claim that there was no bias associated with our sample. 
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 Appendix A – Sample Scenario 
 
The following scenario is an example of Vendor more powerful than retailer, High 
Calculative commitment with Target Vendor, High loyalty commitment with vendor 
salesperson and High loyalty commitment with organization. 
 
Cell 1 
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Purchasing/Procurement Personnel Survey 
 
Thank you for your interest and participation in this study  
This study is part of a research project being conducted by the Marketing Department at Georgia State 
University, Atlanta to better understand the attitudes and perceptions of purchasing/procurement 
managers.  
On the survey, there is no right or wrong answer to any question. We simply want to understand how 
you are likely to respond to a hypothetical situation. Your responses will be held in strict 
confidentiality. No individual’s answers will ever be reported in such a way as to identify that 
individual. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
• Your responses are very important to our research. Incomplete surveys will substantially 
reduce our ability to conduct a good and workable research study, so we kindly request 
your responses to all the questions in the surveys. 
• Please note that your responses will be analyzed with other respondents as a group. 
You will not be personally identified. Hence, your open and candid responses are highly 
appreciated. 
• If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact: 
 
 
 
   Amit Poddar 
Robinson College of Business 
Department of Marketing 
Georgia State University 
35 Broad St., Suite 1300, 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
   E-mail: apoddar@gsu.edu 
   Ph: 404-651-1931 
  Dr Naveen Donthu 
   Katherine S. Bernhardt Research Professor 
Robinson College of Business 
Department of Marketing 
Georgia State University 
35 Broad St., Suite 1300, 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
E-Mail: ndonthu@gsu.edu 
Ph: 404-651-1043 
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 Purchasing /Procurement Personnel Survey 
For the purpose of this exercise assume that you are the purchasing manager for a $ 20 
billion retail chain responsible for purchasing non branded bubble wrap. The majority of the 
business comes from just two vendors.  For the last three years you have been purchasing 
approximately equal amounts of bubble wrap from each vendor (1 billion dollars each). 
The first vendor: Acme Bubble Company is a very big and powerful $80 billion dollar 
firm that you have been doing business with for the last 15 years which controls almost 80% of 
the entire production of bubble wraps in the world. Acme is considered a very powerful company 
since Acme literally sets the price for the entire global market for bubble wraps and hence Acme 
commands tremendous respect in the business world. Acme is also four times larger than your 
company in terms of revenue. Your company has been involved in joint research and 
development with Acme for the last 10 years and you personally spearheaded this initiative with 
Acme. You also have tremendous personal respect for Acme’s professionalism in business. 
You also really like Bob Jones who is the sales person from Acme and is a personal 
friend from your college days. You have been dealing with him even when he was not with Acme. 
Bob is also a great salesperson and in the past has gone out of his way to do favors for you.   
The second vendor, Simons Bubble Co, is a much smaller $20 billion firm that has also 
been in the bubble wrap business for a long time. You have been doing business with them for the 
last 3 years. Since Simmons total revenue is exactly equal to your company, you can say that 
Simmons is equally dependent on you as you are on Simmons. The salesperson for Simons 
Bubble Co is Tom White who was recently appointed and you have found him to be a decent and 
honest man.  
These bubble wraps are an important part of your product portfolio and you definitely 
need to stock them to satisfy your customers. This is the last month of the financial year and you 
are supposed to order 5 million cases of bubble wraps (worth $50 million). You generally give 
the order to the company that offers the biggest trade promotion. Invariably one company always 
has a cash promotion going on and you give the order to that firm. However this month, you have 
been told by your assistant that both Acme and Simmons are running trade promotions and both 
firms have the same amount of trade promotion on offer. It’s totally up to you to decide how to 
divide the order or give the order to only one firm. Irrespective of whose product you choose, 
the overall economic benefit to your firm is the same as these are generic products. 
You have asked your assistant to make a side by side comparison of the two offers. In the 
next page you would find the confidential report submitted by your assistant. 
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To: The Purchasing Manager 
From: Assistant Purchasing Manager 
Sub: Confidential 
Comparison of trade promotion offers for purchase of Bubble wrap 
Total Order size: 50 million dollars (5 million cases) 
Our Turnover this year: $20 
Billion 
Acme Bubble Co 
(recently named the most 
powerful wrap company in 
America) 
Simons Bubble Co 
Approximate Global 
Market Share 
80% 20% 
Total sales to our Firm (avg 
last 3 years) 
$1 billion $1 billion 
Total Yearly Turnover  $80 billion $20 billion 
Trade deal Cash Discount Cash Discount 
Offer $1 per case $1 per case 
Sales Person Mr. Bob Jones Mr Tom White 
Note Your friend Bob made a personal 
request that he needs this order 
 
Note About Company Joint research and development 
program in progress for last 10 
years 
 
Other important 
information 
Likely to launch a new improved 
product in the next few months and 
we might get exclusive distribution 
(our market research says that this 
will be a high margin blockbuster)  
Plus 
Acme in the past has provided year- 
end bonus trade promotions for 
meeting yearly targets. 
-- 
 
 
You have to decide on whose trade offer to take and to what extent. Since the trade deals are 
same in monetary value and the overall sales are also going to be the same, you are free to decide 
on the split or even to give the complete order to one party, without concern that the audit 
department might raise an issue. This being the last month of the fiscal year you can not really 
say “let me accept trade promotion of one company this month and take the other next month”. 
At this point, read the situation again and then make your decision as to what you would 
normally do in real life if you are faced with a situation like this. Once your have decided, answer 
questions regarding your choice on the next page.
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Please answer to the best of your abilities: There is no right or wrong answer. 
1. What percentage of the order would you provide to each firm? (You may provide the entire order to 
one company or split the order between the 2 companies). 
Company Name % order size 
Acme Bubble Co _________% 
Simons Bubble Co _________% 
Total      100 % 
Briefly explain the rationale behind your decision 
 
 
 
 
2. For how much additional trade promotion (Number of cents over $1 per case) from the “loosing 
company” would you be willing to change your order and place equal (50% each) order from both 
companies? 
For example, if in the above question you had decided that you would give Simmons Bubble Co 90% 
and Acme Bubble Co 10% of the order; what amount of additional trade promotion (Number of cents 
over $1 per case) from Acme would make you place equal order  (50% Acme Paper Co and 50% 
Simmons) 
(Current Trade Promotion in dollars: $ 1 per case) 
 
Additional Amount in Cents per Case:                                            _____________ Cents 
 
3. Please ? your agreement / disagreement with the following statements 
Your Company is more dependent on Acme than Acme is 
dependent on your company ? agree  ? disagree 
Acme is more dependent on your Company than your 
company is dependent on Acme ? agree  ? disagree 
Your company is equally dependent on Simmons as 
Simmons is dependent on your company ? agree  ? disagree 
 
State the extent of your agreement or disagreement 
with the following statements (please circle) 
Strongly 
disagree    
Strongly 
agree 
4. Acme Bubble Co can be considered more powerful than 
your company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Acme Bubble Co can be considered more powerful than 
Simons Paper Co. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Acme Bubble Co is more likely to financially benefit your 
company in the medium to long term. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Acme Bubble co is more likely to provide financial gains in 
the near future 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. The relationship with Acme is more established  and 
important than the relationship with Simmons 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. You are more likely to have a soft corner for Acme as 
compared to simmons 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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10. Which vendor’s salesperson you are more likely to feel a 
strong liking for (choose only one option) 
Salesperson 
Name Please ? 
 Bob Jones a. ? 
 Tom White b. ? 
 (Both are same) c. ? 
     
 
11. In your opinion how often do you think the scenario 
described above occurs in practice (meaning two vendors 
who offer the same trade deal and you are forced to make a 
choice) 
Very 
Rarely    
Very  
Often 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
State the extent of your agreement or disagreement 
with the following statements (please circle) 
Strongly 
disagree    
Strongly 
agree 
12. Acme Bubble Co is likely to keep promises it makes to our 
firm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Acme Bubble Co is likely to be always honest with us. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. We are likely to believe the information that Acme Bubble 
Co provides us 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Acme Bubble Co is likely to be genuinely concerned with 
our business needs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. When making important decisions, Acme Bubble Co is 
likely to consider our welfare as well as its own 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. We trust that Acme Bubble Co is likely to keep our best 
interests in mind 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. Acme Bubble Co is likely to be trust worthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. We might find it necessary to be cautious with Acme 
Bubble Co. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      
20. Please mention the extent of your total work experience a. ? Less than 5 years  c. ? 
11 years – 
15 years 
(Please ?) b. ? 5 years to 10 years  d. ? 
More than 
15 years 
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21. Which job title best describes your current position in the company (circle only one) 
1. Purchasing Manager 6. VP of Purchasing 10. Purchasing Supervisor 
2. Purchasing Agent 7. Materials Manager 11. VP of Materials 
3. Purchasing 8. Materials Director 12. Asst Purchasing Agent 
4. Purchasing Director 9. Buying Coordinator 13. Buyer 
5. Other   
 
22. Please check the industry which best describes the company you work in (circle only one) 
1. Retailing 7. Engineering/Research 12. Transportation 
2. Wholesale/ Distribution 8. Finance/Banking/Insurance 13. Publishing 
3. Utilities 9. Food Service 14. Communications 
4. Government 10. Service 15. Construction 
5. Health Services 11. Lodging 16. Education 
6. Other   
 
23. Please indicate the size of your company in terms of annual turnover (circle only one) 
 
1. Less than 5 million 5. 50 to 99.99 million 9. 1 to 4.99 billion 
2. 5 to 9.99 million 6. 100 to 199.99 million 10. 5 to 9.99 billion 
3. 10 to 24. 99 million 7. 200 to 499.99 million 11. 10 to 19.99 billion 
4. 25 to 49.99 million 8. 500 to 999.99 million 12. 20 billion plus 
24. Email address: _________________________________________ 
 
25. Gender  ----------------------------------------------------------------- ? Male/ ? Female (Please ?) 
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Appendix B- Informed Consent Form 
 
 
Georgia State University 
Department of Marketing 
Informed Consent Form 
Title:     Trade promotion choice study 
 
Principal Investigator:  Amit Poddar  
I. Introduction/Background/Purpose: Research has shown that retail buyers face 
more trade promotion choices than what they can accept. The purpose of the 
study is to understand how retail buyers make choices especially when faced 
with parity economic benefits 
 
II. Procedures: This exercise would not take more than 20 minutes. You will be 
asked to respond to some hypothetical situations that would be presented to you. 
III. Risks: The research involves no risk to you or your company.  
IV. Benefits: The research adds to our knowledge of understanding choice 
behavior. By participating you would be helping develop new knowledge which 
would help future managers. Also since we would be sharing the findings of this 
research with all the participating managers, you would be free to use the 
findings in your own business environment. 
V. Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: Participation in research is voluntary. 
You have the right to refuse to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and 
change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time.  
VI. Confidentiality: We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. We 
will not be collecting your name or the name of your company. No facts that might 
point to you will appear when we present this study or publish its results.  You will 
not be identified personally in the research findings. The email addresses collected 
will not be sold or shared with any third party and will be used solely for the purpose 
of sharing the findings of the survey 
VII. Contact Persons: Call Amit Poddar at 404 - 651-1931 if you have questions about 
this study.  If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this 
research study, you may contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Georgia 
State University which oversees the protection of human research participants. Susan 
Vogtner in the office of research compliance can be reached at 404-463-0674.  
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Appendix C – Advertisements Used  
 
Advertisements used in search advertising using Google adwords program. 
 
  
 
 
Purchasing Manager Study  
Participate in this Research Survey  
By Georgia State University  
education.gsu.edu/sma 
 
Purchasing Manager Study  
Improve your purchasing! Take part  
in study by Ga State. Free report!  
education.gsu.edu/sma 
 
How do you choose vendors  
if two vendors offer the same deal  
Take part in Purchase Study at GSU  
education.gsu.edu/sma 
 
Improve your Purchasing  
Purchase Managers. Take part in  
this study today. Get free report!  
education.gsu.edu/sma 
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